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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Violent radicalisation and extremism have always existed, although the terms used have 
varied at different times. In Finland, violent extremism was quite visible until the Second 
World War, after which extremist groups seldom took any visible action. However, due to 
international developments, the situation in Finland gradually began to change in the 
2000s, and violent radicalisation and extremism have been a growing phenomenon also in 
Finland in the 2010s. The development of violent extremism in Finland has been described 
in the reviews of violent extremism regularly published by the Ministry of the Interior, which 
are available on the Ministry of the Interior’s website1. 
Violent radicalisation and extremism are a threat to security, the sense of security, people’s 
wellbeing and the sense of participation, democracy as well as human and fundamental 
rights. The effects of related acts are always broader than those of single acts. The 
prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism is a shared task for the whole of society, 
and different authorities and civil society are jointly responsible for it. This is the only way 
to combat the related complex and changing threat and maintain in Finland an open 
society in which diverse groups of people can live peacefully side by side. 
The National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism 
was prepared in broad cooperation with the authorities (national and local authorities), 
organisations and communities. Researchers were also involved in the preparatory 
work. The National Cooperation Network acted as the steering group for preparing the 
action plan, the content of which was prepared in workshops. A list of the experts who 
participated in the preparation work is provided in Appendix 1.  
The results and recommendations of the external assessment of the previous Action Plan, 
which was confirmed in 2016, have been taken into consideration in preparing the current 
Action Plan. The results and recommendations of the assessment were published in April 
1  Website of the Ministry of the Interior intermin.fi/vastuualueet/poliisiasiat/väkivaltainen radikalisoituminen.
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20192. The experiences introduced by the broad group of experts who participated in the 
preparation work, as well as good practices concerning the work done, were taken into 
consideration in the objectives and measures. 
The work done in Finland to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism has also 
been assessed by the United Nations (UN). The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive 
Directorate (CTED) carried out a country assessment in April 2019, in which it assessed how 
Finland has implemented UN Security Council Resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005) and 
2178 (2014)3. In its assessment, the Directorate praised the broad cooperation carried out 
in Finland and the fact that the authorities, civil society and communities in the country all 
contribute to the prevention of violent radicalisation. In addition, the implementation of an 
external assessment of the 2016 Action Plan was considered highly positive. Finland was 
also praised for its preventive actions, in which measures to deal with people returning from 
the conflict areas in Syria and Iraq have been planned well in advance before the activation 
of the situation4. Anchor work was seen as a good practice, and measures taken in the 
education sector to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism received praise. 
In the European Union, the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism has been 
developed by the European Commission. In the summer 2018, the Council accepted a 
high-level report5 that describes the EU’s common priorities for preventive work as well 
as a structure through which the EU supports the work done in the Member States and 
coordinates different functions. The implementation of the recommendations presented in 
the high-level report and the effectiveness of the coordination structure were assessed in 
the EU together with the Member States at the end of 2019. Where necessary, operations 
within the EU’s structures will be reviewed on the basis of the assessment. 
The objective of preventing violent radicalisation and extremism in Finland is that the 
actions to be implemented are based on researched information. Research into the 
phenomenon has increased and a large number of research papers have been published 
on the subject internationally and in Finland in the last few years. Research and its results 
have been utilised in preparing the Action Plan, and the participation of researchers in 
the work has supported research-based operations. The information and observations 
found in the reports and investigations published in the last few years have been taken 
into consideration in the content of this Action Plan. One of the reports and investigations 
2  Assessment of the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism of the 
Ministry of the Interior. Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:18.
3  The UN resolutions are found at www.un.org/resolutions-0.
4  Proposal for arranging cooperation between the authorities to deal with returnees from conflict areas.
5  High-Level Commission Expert Group on Radicalisation (HLCEG-R). Final Report 18 May 2018.
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is the report6 prepared by the Safety Investigation Authority regarding the stabbings that 
occurred in Turku on 18 August 2018, explaining how the incident unfolded, its causes 
and consequences as well as stating recommendations for the development of actions 
in response. On the basis of the report, the Ministry of the Interior launched a project in 
which case management between the police and other authorities was developed for 
situations where a person has become or is at risk of becoming radicalised7. Measures that 
implement the recommendations of the report have been attached to this Action Plan. 
Multi-professional Anchor work is an important element in preventing violent radicalisation. 
The Anchor manual8, which supports the operations of the Anchor teams to prevent violent 
radicalisation, was prepared in collaboration with the Ministry of the Interior, the National 
Police Board and the University of Eastern Finland in a project funded by the EU Internal 
Security Fund. 
The purpose of this Action Plan is to describe the joint national strategy guiding the 
prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism and to set out the related objectives and 
measures. Some of the objectives and measures describe actions in cross-sectoral entities, 
and some of the objectives and measures of different actors. The cross-sectoral entities were 
prepared by the experts in these sectors. The Action Plan is not an exhaustive manual or 
handbook, but rather provides information of relevance to prevention. A number of actors 
at the national, regional and local levels participate in the implementation of the Action 
Plan, which is intended to serve all of them.
6  Turku stabbings 18 August 2018. Safety Investigation Authority, P2017-01.
7  Observations about the case management interface and recommendations for the development of operations. 
Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:17.
8  Anchor manual. Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:16.
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1 Background and grounds for the work
Violent extremism and the operation of extremist movements are a threat to democracy, 
human and fundamental rights, social order and people’s safety and sense of security. 
The Constitution of Finland secures the inviolability of human dignity and the freedoms 
and rights of individuals, and it promotes a fair society. The prevention of violent 
radicalisation and extremism is related to the realisation of equality guaranteed under 
the Constitution, according to which, no one may, without valid reasons, be treated 
differently on the grounds of their origin, language, religion, conviction, opinion or other 
personal characteristic. The Constitution guarantees not only personal freedom and 
integrity but also freedom of religion and freedom of speech. In general, the ideology of 
all violent extremist movements is based on the idea that people and groups of people 
are in a different position depending on the human dignity they have. Violent extremist 
movements divide people into friends and enemies, and the use of violence towards 
individuals and groups defined as enemies is permitted, desirable and sometimes even 
an obligation. Violent extremist movements seek to limit freedom of speech by imposing 
pressure and sometimes also violence and the threat of violence towards individuals who 
present opinions and views that are ”wrong” from the group’s ideological viewpoint or 
criticise the activities and ideology of the extremist group in question. 
In Finland, violent radicalisation and extremism have been prevented systematically since 
2012 when the first National Action Plan was confirmed. The second National Action Plan 
was confirmed in April 2016. The Action Plan was drawn up and implemented through 
broad cooperation between different authorities and non-governmental organisations.  
Representatives of civil society also broadly contributed to the work. The implementation 
of the National Action Plan 2016 was assessed by an external reviser and the assessment 
report was published in April 20199. This third National Action Plan takes into 
9  Assessment of the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism of the 
Ministry of the Interior. Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:18.
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consideration the experiences gained from earlier work and the results of the assessment, 
including its recommendations. 
Preventing violent radicalisation and extremism is an important element in promoting 
equality. In Finland, the focus is on preventive operations that are based on broad 
cooperation. The National Action Plan guides local and regional work based on a local, 
up-to-date overview. Regional and local action plans need not be compiled unless there 
is a special need to do so. Where necessary, different actors can draw up manuals and 
handbooks supporting and promoting preventive work. 
International operations play an important role in preventing violent radicalisation. 
Violent radicalisation takes place locally, although the factors affecting it are often global 
and spread across borders. The UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent 
Extremism was published in January 2016. The Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CE) actively contribute to the prevention 
of violent radicalisation. In the last few years, the European Union (EU) has increased 
its efforts to prevent violent extremism. The work at the EU level is coordinated and 
developed by the EU Commission, which will invest EUR 60 million in the work over the 
next four years. The financial aid supports the work done in the Member States in a variety 
of ways. Nordic cooperation to prevent violent extremism was launched between the 
ministries with a cooperation agreement signed in January 2015. A process is currently 
in progress in which the cooperation network between the ministries and the operation 
of the Nordic Safe Cities network are combined and the coordinating role of the Nordic 
Council in the operation is strengthened. Different actors, such as the police, social and 
health services, as well as the education sector, have their own international networks in 
which operations are developed. 
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2 The situation concerning violent 
extremism in Finland and Europe 
The prevention of national violent extremism and radicalisation targets all forms of violent 
extremism in Finland. These include the violent non-parliamentary far right, violent 
non-parliamentary far left, religiously motivated violent extremism, radical alternative 
movements as well as individual actors. Individual actors may be motivated by different 
violent extremist ideologies, and they may not be attached to any particular ideology. 
Violent non-parliamentary far right
The neo-Nazi Pohjoismainen Vastarintaliike PVL (Nordic Resistance Movement) is the 
most visible far right extremist group in Finland. According to estimates, it has about one 
hundred members who participate in its activities in one way or another10. The National 
Police Board required the abolition of the PVL under the Associations Act, considering 
it an organisation whose activities run counter to existing laws and good practice. In 
2018, the Turku Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the Pirkanmaan District Court in 
2017 to impose a ban on the PVL and organisations linked to it. The PVL has the right to 
appeal the decision and the matter is currently being considered by the Supreme Court. 
While waiting for a final decision, it appears that the PVL will continue its activities under 
the new name Kohti vapautta (Towards Freedom). The organisation continues to spread 
National Socialist propaganda in the usual way through the internet and distributing 
flyers. Some of the organisation’s active members have established a new association, 
Kansan yhtenäisyys ry (People’s Unity), which they seek to register as a political party. 
During its first year of activities, the association failed to collect the 5,000 supporter cards 
required for the establishment of a political party. The PVL participates in demonstrations. 
In a National Socialist demonstration arranged on Finnish Independence Day in 2018, four 
of the PVL’s active members lead the procession carrying swastika flags. The association is 
10  In 2016, the United Kingdom used anti-terrorism laws to ban the activities of the violent far right group 
National Action. The group has approximately 100 active members. It should be noted by way of comparison that 
the population of the United Kingdom is over 60 million, while that of Finland is 5.5 million.
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suspected of criminal activity, such as incitement to ethnic hatred. There is a high threat of 
violence with the PVL and its successors because the association considers itself entitled 
to target violence at people it perceives as enemies. The enemy can be anyone who has a 
negative attitude towards the association and the National Socialist ideology it represents. 
The aim of its activities is to arouse fear among people through the use of flags and 
symbols, for example. The groups which the association acts in opposition to recognise 
these symbols and the threatening messages connected with them. 
Soldiers of Odin, an anti-immigration group, has resumed its activities. In 2019, the 
organisation had active street-patrolling groups in at least 30 locations. Some citizens 
consider these patrols a threat. For example, a crime report was filed in connection with 
patrolling in a shopping centre. Some members of Soldiers of Odin have been suspected 
of violent crimes. 
In the past couple of years, there have been indications that the Soldiers of Odin and 
the PVL are establishing closer links. The Soldiers of Odin has attended several PVL 
demonstrations and also expressed in public that it supports the PVL in the matter 
concerning its abolition. In addition, members of the PVL have occasionally participated in 
Soldiers of Odin street patrols. 
Violent far right groups make efficient use of local incidents that attract a lot of attention 
and make people upset. A good example of this is the video published by Soldiers of 
Odin in February 2019 that suggests a threat of violence related to the suspected sexual 
abuse of minors, a topic that was widely publicised in the media. In the video, the group 
announced that it would take action to detect persons guilty of sexual crime. The rhetoric 
and visual air used in the video suggested the introduction of violent action. The material 
creates and sustains an atmosphere that entitles one to use violence and can act as an 
incentive for racist hate crime. It also aggravates confrontation locally and creates an 
atmosphere of fear and suspicion, in which all immigrants are considered responsible 
for offences committed by individuals. Regional groups inspired by extremist far-
right ideology also emerge in Finland occasionally, giving rise to a local security threat, 
especially in the form of assaults.
The threat of terrorism related to the violent far right has grown in Europe in the last few 
years. According to a Europol report, arrests related to far-right terrorism are still rare, 
though their number has increased during the past three years. In Germany in the last few 
years, extremist violence motivated by the far right has been targeted at, among others, 
reception centres, mosques as well as government and political actors. Far-right unrest 
erupted after a stabbing in Chemnitz in 2018, which was committed by a person with an 
immigrant background. The incident launched large-scale demonstrations. A group of 
people prepared violent attacks against immigrants and officials. However, the group, 
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known as Revolution Chemnitz, was detected before it managed to launch the attacks, 
and its members are suspected of preparing terrorist attacks. In June 2019, a local German 
politician belonging to the CDU party was murdered at home, and the police suspect that 
the murder was motivated by far-right ideology. Far-right actors were sentenced to long 
prison terms in Germany in 2018. 
Two people have died in far-right attacks in the United Kingdom since 2016. Both of the 
attacks were committed by individuals acting alone. In the first attack, an immigration-
liberal politician was stabbed. In the second, the attacker drove a car into a crowd in front 
of a mosque. In the United Kingdom last year, many far-right supporters were sentenced 
to prison terms for belonging to the National Action organisation, which was ordered to 
be abolished under the anti-terrorism act in 2016, and for planning politically motivated 
acts of violence. One of those sentenced had dual citizenship of Finland and the United 
Kingdom.
Serious attacks using home-made explosives occurred in Sweden at the end of 2016 and 
the beginning of 2017. Two of the attacks were close to reception centres, and one was 
in front of business premises favoured by left-wing activists. One person was seriously 
injured in the attacks. The attacks were committed by individuals who support neo-
Nazism and were sentenced to unconditional imprisonment.
A nationalist and white supremacist attacked two mosques in Christchurch in New 
Zealand in March 2019, killing 50 people. The crime is being investigated as a terrorist act. 
The attacker had published a manifesto on the 8chan website, in which he explained his 
motives. He published video of the attack directly on Facebook, which was the first time 
a terrorist attack was streamed directly via the Internet. The video of the killing was also 
edited with game effects, and the ”game” was then shared further. Violent far-right groups 
make diverse use of the media. The shooting in a mosque in Norway in August 2019 is 
considered generally and also by the police as a terrorist act. The attacker killed his step-
sister before the shooting. The threat of the violent far right to religious communities and 
their premises is considered to have increased. 
Hate campaigns pursued by anti-immigration actors
The hate campaigns devised by the far right and other anti-immigration actors have 
become more common in the last few years. The campaigns, which are targeted at the 
authorities, reporters and researchers, for example, stem from the anti-immigration trend 
that activated after 2015 and the increase in the number of counter-media websites linked 
with the phenomenon. The group of actors engaged in hate campaigns is quite small. 
The activities mainly centre around individuals associated with anti-immigration as well 
as around MV lehti, a counter-media magazine. However, the phenomenon is boosted by 
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several anonymous social media profiles. Politicians, officials, reporters and researchers 
are chosen as the targets of hate campaigns. They all have in common an attempt to 
intervene in or comment on the activities of the anti-immigration movement. Hate 
campaigns take a variety of forms. Anti-immigration actors may, for example, comment 
on their targets with the intention of defaming them or making unfounded statements 
or claims about them. The personal data of the victims of such harassment can be spread 
online and slanderous articles about them may be published on counter-media websites. 
Actors engaged in hate campaigns typically also insult and threaten their targets, such as 
through social media or email. The aim of hate campaigns is to influence the behaviour of 
the target and to present that person and the organisation they represent in a negative 
light, such as unreliable, partial or unprofessional. This can be a very traumatic experience 
for the person subjected to a hate campaign. This weakens their safety and sense of 
security as well as weakening trust in society and other people. This, in turn, can serve as a 
basis for violent radicalisation. 
Violent non-parliamentary far left
Anarchist and anti-fascist radical unrest takes the form of demonstrations opposing the far 
right, in which aggressive individuals acting alone seek to violently engage the far right. It 
is estimated that the activities of the radical far left in Finland involve a few dozen people. 
They are usually able to mobilise at the most about two hundred people at their biggest 
demonstrations. A more common operating model used by radical anti-fascists in other 
European countries is attacks against people profiled as supporters of the far right–a trend 
still quite rare in Finland. Radical anti-fascists mainly operate through the internet instead 
of taking direct action on the streets. The most typical operating model is publishing 
information on far-right supporters and far-right events and where they are organised. The 
purpose is not only to reveal things about the far right but also to put pressure on people 
to abandon the movement. 
In Central and Western Europe, violent far-left extremism takes the form of rioting at 
demonstrations and violence against far-right supporters. Anarchist riots took place 
during the G20 protests in Hamburg in 2017. In 2018, the media reported that anarchists 
had also participated in yellow-vest riots in France. Militant anti-fascist groups, usually 
known as Antifa or AFA, target systematic violence against people profiled as far-right 
supporters in many European countries. In Sweden and Germany, for example, the homes 
of selected people are still attacked, and victims are beaten and threatened every year. 
Planned assaults and threats in public places are also characteristic of such groups. A 
particular variety is the far-left terrorism seen in Southern Europe, especially in Greece 
and Italy. Bomb attacks against political, economic or governmental targets occasionally 
occur in these countries. Two bomb attacks thought to be the work of anarchists occurred 
in Greece last year and one in Italy. A new trend in the last few years has been the support 
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shown by anarchists and anti-fascists for the Kurds. Anarchists from Europe, including 
Finland, have participated in armed combat against ISIL in Syria. Anarchists also oppose 
Turkey, which they consider a fascist state, and the repression it exercises against the 
Kurds.
It is estimated in many European countries that the threat related to the violent far left has 
the potential to increase.
Radical alternative groups
Actions taken by radical alternative groups have been scarce after 2016 when the 
movement against the planned nuclear power station in Pyhäjoki weakened. The protest, 
which lasted for about two years and even developed violent features, ended in April 2016 
when the police removed demonstrators from close to the site. Signs of the activation 
of radical environmentalism again appeared at the beginning of 2019 when several 
demonstrations were arranged close to the mine in Valkeakoski. As a rule, however, the 
principles of non-violent civil disobedience have been followed at the demonstrations.
Religiously motivated violent extremism
The terrorism threat level in Finland is at the second lowest level of 2 (elevated) on a four-
level scale. The terrorist organisation ISIL considers Finland a justified terrorism target. The 
threat of terrorism in Finland is primarily attributed to individual actors or groups fostering 
radical Islamist ideology or promoting its ambitions. There were 370 people subject to 
anti-terrorism surveillance. The number of such people has almost doubled in a few years 
as a result of the activation of recruitment and facilitation networks connected with the 
conflict in Syria and Iraq and the foreign combatant phenomenon. 
Travelling to Iraq and Syria came to an almost complete halt after 2015, and the number 
of returnees from the area has remained almost the same, i.e. at about 20. The authorities 
have identified more than 80 adults who have travelled to the area from Finland. Children 
were also taken to the area. Finland has prepared for the arrival of returnees from the 
conflict area by developing operations based on cooperation between the authorities11. 
The operations have been further developed since March 2019 by preparing for the return 
to Finland of individuals or groups from the Al-Holi camp, which is maintained by the 
Kurds, either assisted or independently. 
11  Proposal for arranging cooperation between the authorities to deal with returnees from conflict areas, Ministry 
of the Interior publications, 11/2017. The Ministerial Working Group for Internal Security and Justice approved the 
proposal in April 2017.
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From the point of view of future trends in religiously motivated violent extremism and 
prevention, there is concern about the 600 children of anti-terrorism targets. Of the 
children, about 30 were taken to areas controlled by ISIL in Syria and Iraq, and more 
children were born there. The degree to which the children have been exposed to the 
radicalising influence of their parents may vary. For terrorist organisations, children 
represent the future and the continuation of the ideology. 
ISIL is still a threat in spite of having lost its territory in Syria and Iraq. ISIL and its 
supporters are still spreading material instigating violence over the internet. In Finland, 
the amount of such material has been small by international standards, although the 
volume of online communication related to Finland was larger than ever for a couple of 
years after 2014. Finns appeared in ISIL’s materials, and ISIL supporters in Finland produced 
and distributed material.  Propaganda instigating terrorism has moved to closed platforms 
since 2016. This is due to technology companies starting to remove such material more 
efficiently. 
The threat of religiously motivated violent extremism is increased by possible returnees 
from the conflict area in Syria and Iraq as well as the group made up by radicalised people 
in Finland. The returnees, who are still committed to ISIL’s ideology, can serve as an 
example and role model for others and instigate them to violent acts.  
Religiously motivated violent extremism and the related terrorism are still the biggest 
terrorism threat in Europe12. A total of 13 people were killed in attacks in 2018, and 
the authorities prevented 16 attacks. According to Europol, people with a criminal 
background, including those serving a sentence, are a special risk group because they are 
subjected to indoctrination by terrorist groups. 
Al-Qaida was weakened after the death of Osama Bin Laden. However, it has endeavoured 
to increase its influence in the last few years by again establishing relations with regional 
actors. It still aims to launch attacks in Europe and the United States. 
12  European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2019. Europol.
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3 Violent radicalisation and extremism  
– national definitions
There is no established international definition for violent radicalisation and extremism. In 
Finland, work is based on a definition that was confirmed in the National Action Plan for 
the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism 2016. Those definitions are also 
used in this Action Plan. 
The following definitions are used in Finland: 
Violent extremism refers to using, threatening with, instigating, encouraging or justifying 
violence based on ideological grounds. Violent extremism is not a concept used in criminal 
law. Extremist violence is not necessarily subversive and is often targeted at a group or 
individuals defined as enemies. It causes fear and a sense of insecurity locally, as in single 
city districts or residential areas, and can also be targeted at property. Crime motivated 
by hate and/or racism (hate crime) can also be extremist when it is motivated by a whole 
ideology. 
Violent radicalisation is a process through which individuals end up using or threatening 
the use of violence, urging someone to commit acts of violence or justifying it on 
ideological grounds. During the radicalisation process, the individual begins to accept and 
favour violence, regardless of the ideology or stimuli adopted from different ideologies 
that they use to justify violence. There are always multiple reasons behind radicalisation, 
and radicalised people do not share a single common profile. Factors underlying 
radicalisation have been investigated quite extensively and they are usually connected 
with social factors and factors related to the individual. These factors can also be divided 
into those that pull and those that push. The social network plays a role, and the individual 
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may become radicalised as part of the network13. Emotions are important in radicalisation, 
and ideological factors also play a role. Problems with making a living and social exclusion 
may promote violent radicalisation but do not account for it alone. Situational factors 
contribute to why some individuals become radicalised and others do not. 
Ideology in this Action Plan refers to a worldview that is common to a specific group of 
people and stems from attitudes about groups of people, the world, religion, relations 
between people and states, human dignity, what is sacred and what is profane as well as 
corresponding beliefs that constitute a moral compass for an individual. 
Terrorism is always a form of violent extremism, but not all violent extremism is terrorism. 
Crimes committed with terrorist intent are defined in the Criminal Code of Finland 
(section 34a14). Terrorist violence is subversive and targeted at countries or international 
organisations. Among other things, the purpose of terrorism is to cause serious fear 
among the population.
An extremist offence refers to crime motivated by the ideology of the person committing 
it. The difference between hate crime and extremist crime is that the former is connected 
with a specific characteristic of the victim, while the latter is motivated by an entire 
ideology. All violent crime related to violent extremist groups and the actions of their 
members is considered extremist violence. The violence exercised by visible extremist 
groups is instrumental regardless of the target or momentary motive of violence, and the 
general threat of violence increases the group’s ability to create fear. However, violent 
crimes committed by violent extremist groups and their members are not considered 
extremist crimes if they clearly have some other motive, such as violence related to other 
forms of crime, quarrels related to private life or family or domestic violence.
Target area for the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism. The 
commonality and popularity of violent extremism is affected by all decisions and 
measures taken in the various fields of social policy. A successful education policy, 
healthcare and social welfare policy, employment policy and social planning, for 
example, can prevent violent radicalisation and extremism. However, if not implemented 
successfully, they may also create a breeding ground for violent radicalisation and 
extremism. Promoting wellbeing and preventing social exclusion are important from 
13  Religiously motivated radicalisation and related networks in Finland are described in the Ministry of the Interior 
publication 2019:14 Malkki & Saarinen. The Jihadist movement in Finland. Far-right actions and groups in Finland 
are described in the publication ”Ulkoparlamentaarinen äärioikeistoliikehdintä ja maahanmuuttovastaisuus 2010-
luvun Suomessa” (Non-parliamentary far-right movement and anti-immigration in Finland in the 2010s). Daniel 
Sallamaa 2018. University of Helsinki, Publications of the Faculty of Social Studies. 
14  Criminal Code of Finland, section 34a(1): A person who, with terrorist intent and in a manner that is likely to 
cause serious harm to a State or an international organisation, makes...”
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the point of view of society, though they cannot alone prevent violent radicalisation. In 
this Action Plan, preventing violent radicalisation and extremism means special actions 
taken to influence a trend that over the long term may lead to the violent radicalisation 
of individuals and groups15. At its worst, violent radicalisation and extremism can lead to 
terrorism. This Action Plan does not discuss measures related to combatting terrorism, 
which have been described in the counter-terrorism strategy16. 
15  For the Action Plan’s target area, see the Ministry of the Interior’s Assessment of the National Action Plan for the 
Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism. Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:18.
16  National counter-terrorism strategy 2018–2021. Publications of the Ministry of the Interior 23/2018.  
http://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/161182/23_2018_Kansallinen%20
terrorismintorjunnan%20strategia%202018-2021_netti.pdf.
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4 Finland’s strategy for the prevention of 
violent radicalisation and extremism
The measures taken by Finland to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism are based 
on the following strategic guidelines that direct the objectives and measures of preventive 
operations. 
1. The national prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism 
is targeted at all forms of violent extremism occurring in Finland 
that use violence and instigate or encourage the use of violence in 
order to achieve their goals. These are: violent far right and far left, 
religiously motivated violent extremism and radical environmental 
movements. The activeness of groups and actors varies over time. 
Preventive measures are also targeted at individual actors whose 
actions may be motivated by any of the above ideologies or some 
other motive that fulfills the definition of violent extremism. 
Individual actors seldom act completely alone and almost always 
have contacts over the internet with people who share the same 
ideas. 
2. Combatting violent extremism is based on respecting fundamental 
and human rights and the principles of the rule of law. 
3. The prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation is based on 
information and managing through knowledge. It is essential to 
increase knowledge about violent extremism and radicalisation as 
well as effective practices and procedures for their prevention. 
4. The prevention of violent extremism and radicalisation is based on 
cooperation between national and local authorities as well as with 
non-governmental organisations, communities and researchers. 
Cooperation may also take the form of multi-professional 
cooperation, such as Anchor work or other cooperation. This allows 
sharing a common overview and referring customers from one 
service provider to another effectively and without interruption. 
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5. The prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism is open 
cooperation, where interaction between the various actors engaged 
in the work is important. Interaction builds the confidence required 
by cooperation. Cooperation ensures that those participating in the 
work share a common understanding of the phenomenon as well 
as preventive efforts and their objectives. Openness, exchange of 
information and knowledge-based operations promote the correct 
targeting of measures. 
6. There are many factors underlying violent radicalisation, making it 
impossible to define any single profile that would be common to all 
who are violently radicalised. Therefore, the means for preventing 
violent radicalisation differ according to the situation and individual 
in question. Preventing social exclusion is an important form of 
preventive work in view of people’s wellbeing and positive social 
development, though it is not alone sufficient to prevent violent 
extremism and radicalisation.  Preventive work makes use of means 
used by the security authorities, including tools (visible actions by 
the police, data acquisition and possible pre-trial investigation) and 
so-called soft tools, such as integration, participation and methods 
for strengthening control over life, which are implemented, for 
example, by the authorities responsible for wellbeing services and 
education. Non-governmental organisations play a key role in view 
of the above methods as they strengthen people’s participation in 
society, offer channels for influence and promote the social sense 
of togetherness. The range of tools must be broad in order for 
prevention to be effective. Different actors have access to different 
tools, and using these together, separately and coherently allows 
the development of radicalisation to be interrupted and the 
reduction of the negative effects of polarisation and confrontation 
on society. 
7. It is important to intervene with individuals, their friends and 
relatives as well as to provide other forms of support. In this, use is 
made of the existing basic services, such as healthcare and social 
welfare services, and multi-professional groups such as Anchor 
teams. Targeted services are also needed, such as Exit activities for 
individuals directly affected by violent radicalisation. 
8. The participation of young people, women and religious 
communities in the prevention of violent radicalisation and 
extremism is strengthened so that their knowledge and 
competence can be broadly harnessed in the work.  
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5 Parties participating in the 
implementation of the Action Plan, 
their duties in prevention and the 
organisation of activities 
5.1 National and local organisation of preventive work
National work to prevent violent radicalisation is guided by the Ministerial Working Group 
on Internal Security and Strengthening the Rule of Law. Nationally, preventive work is 
developed, coordinated and led by the National Cooperation Network set up by the 
Ministry of the Interior. The members of the National Cooperation Network represent the 
key national, regional and local authorities and non-governmental organisations. 
At the local level, violent radicalisation and extremism is prevented through cooperation 
involving different authorities and non-governmental organisations. Violent radicalisation 
is both a social and a security threat to local people, communities and businesses. Factors 
promoting violent radicalisation are global, national and local. The effects of violent 
extremism are seen locally in the environment where people live, where they go to work 
and school and where they spend their leisure time. Locally, prevention is based on 
cooperation between different authorities and with non-governmental organisations, 
permanent multi-professional structures (such as Anchor work) as well as practical 
interventions and support targeted at individuals at risk of radicalisation or subject to a 
threat posed by violent extremist groups. Their friends and relatives often need support. 
It was decided in the 2019 Government Programme of Prime Minister Antti Rinne that 
violent radicalisation will be prevented through cooperation between authorities 
and non-governmental organisations as well as through supporting the work of non-
governmental organisations. Non-governmental organisations should be taken into 
consideration when the authorities organise efforts to prevent violent radicalisation 
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and extremism nationally, regionally and locally. The Government Programme of Prime 
Minister Rinne allocated financing to non-governmental organisations’ actions to prevent 
violent radicalisation17. Financing is coordinated by the Ministry of Justice and it is 
intended to promote the implementation of the National Action Plan for the Prevention 
of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism. The National Cooperation Network submits an 
opinion about the project proposals before decisions are made. 
5.2 Prevention duties of the implementing parties and the 
organisation of preventive operations
The Ministry of the Interior coordinates the prevention of violent radicalisation and 
extremism nationally. The Ministry of the Interior’s coordination and management 
responsibility is based on its statutory duties concerning the National Police Board, 
maintaining public order and safety and security as well as the police combatting crime. 
The Ministry of the Interior appoints and leads the National Cooperation Network. Violent 
extremism seeks to undermine social and public order, which underlines the responsibility 
of the Ministry of the Interior and the police in prevention. The statutory duty of the police 
is to maintain public order and safety and security. Maintaining public order and security 
includes all actions taken by the police to create and maintain a safe and pleasant living 
and operating environment for members of society, combat and prevent disturbances 
and violations of the law as well as eliminate disturbances and investigate violations of the 
law. The police are responsible for crime prevention, including terrorism prevention.  At 
its worst, violent radicalisation and extremism can lead to terrorist acts, so the prevention 
of violent radicalisation and extremism is an important element in preventing terrorism. 
Violent extremism can also be a motive for crime.  
The police encounter individuals in their work who are becoming or have become 
violently radicalised or commit crime motivated by violent extremism. Successful 
encounters between the police, local residents and communities strengthen people’s 
trust in the police and society. At the local level, the police can solve problems that 
when aggravated could provide a breeding ground for violent radicalisation. All police 
17  The second objective of the Government Programme of Prime Minister Antti Rinne  defines the comprehensive 
security of society and the prevention of radicalisation. Radicalisation will be prevented through cooperation 
between authorities and organisations and by supporting the work of organisations. Sufficient financing and 
guidance for organisations will be ensured to enable them to operate nationwide and on a long-term basis. Details 
of services will be provided to various authorities so that they can refer persons in need of help to the appropriate 
support services. 
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departments carry out organised preventive work18, which is crucial in preventing violent 
radicalisation and in related cooperation with other authorities and local communities. 
Multi-professional Anchor work is implemented in almost all police departments in 
Finland, intervening in situations, helping customers abandon violent action and referring 
them to the services of non-governmental organisations and authorities19. According to 
the guidelines of the National Police Board, the preventive actions taken by the police and 
Anchor are points of contact in case of concern about violent radicalisation. If Anchor work 
has not yet been started in an area, the contact point is some other designated multi-
professional group. The representative of the National Police Board is a member of the 
National Cooperation Network. 
The Finnish Security and Intelligence Service has the statutory task of producing, 
under the guidance of the Ministry of the Interior, information to protect the safety and 
security of citizens as well as to detect, prevent and expose such operations, undertakings 
and crime that could threaten state and public order and internal or external safety. The 
Finnish Security and Intelligence Service focuses on detecting and combatting the most 
serious threats to national security, such as terrorism, identifying individuals connected 
with terrorism, maintaining an overview of terrorism as well as updating the national 
terrorism threat assessment.
It also monitors international trends in terrorism and produces intelligence information 
and analyses on phenomena threatening national security for the needs of the 
government and other authorities. To combat terrorism, the Finnish Security and 
Intelligence Service pursues daily cooperation with police departments and other law 
enforcement authorities as well as international partners. The exchange of information 
between local police and the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service is important for 
creating a national and local overview. The Finnish Security and Intelligence Service 
constantly maintains and develops general readiness to detect and prevent any actions 
that could threaten the safety and security of society.
Another task of the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service is to train and offer expert 
assistance to other authorities and parties in questions related to violent radicalisation 
and extremism, together with the rest of the police. The Finnish Security and Intelligence 
Service is a member of the National Cooperation Network on preventing violent 
18  Preventive work done by the police is governed by the Strategy for Preventive Police Work 2019–2023, which 
was confirmed in December 2018.
19  The prevention of violent radicalisation was added to the agenda of the Anchor teams in the National Action 
Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism 2016. Instructions for preventive work by the 
Anchor teams are provided in the Anchor Manual, Ministry of the Interior Publications 2019:16.
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radicalisation and extremism, which was set up by the Ministry of the Interior, and 
contributes to creating an overview of violent extremism. 
Healthcare and social welfare services. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the 
Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare and the Association of Finnish Local and Regional 
Authorities participate in the implementation of the National Action Plan and the 
operations of the National Cooperation Network. Nationally, it is important to strengthen 
cooperation between different authorities and the third sector, develop research-based 
working methods and promote the competence of healthcare and social welfare services 
as well as other professionals. The Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare plans and 
provides training and tools that strengthen the competence of professionals in the fields 
as well as research supporting these in accordance with national objectives. A cross-
sectional approach and multi-professional cooperation in the National Action Plan are 
also the cornerstones of social and health care services. The operations are governed by 
legislation concerning social and health care. 
According to a survey conducted at the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare, social 
welfare professionals are most likely to encounter a child who arouses concern in child 
and family services, adult social work and immigrant services. Professionals in primary 
health care are most likely to encounter a patient who arouses concern in health centre 
work, especially in psychiatric and substance abuse services. In specialised medical 
care, the most likely place to encounter such a patient is in adult psychiatry and youth 
psychiatric services. 
Knowledge of the tools for identification and prevention is vital, as is a clear 
understanding of the necessary services that a radicalised customer can be referred to 
if the medical professional’s own skills and/or cooperation with other actors in the area 
are not sufficient. Some of the local social and health care professionals work in multi-
professional Anchor teams. 
Municipalities and joint municipal authorities as well as other employers of social and 
health care professionals are responsible for the sufficiency of the required resources as 
well as for developing the knowledge and skills of professionals. Organising cooperation 
in a networked manner with non-governmental organisations, for instance, is important 
as some radicalised individuals do not trust or want to deal with the authorities.  Restoring 
confidence can take time and calls for cooperation between different actors. 
Social welfare services 
It is possible to identify signs suggesting radicalisation in social welfare services and refer 
individuals arousing concern to the services they need, most importantly to services 
related to family support, livelihood, housing, education and employment. Correctly 
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targeted and timed support measures lead to better integration with the surrounding 
community and can interrupt the process of radicalisation. Child welfare measures may be 
needed when a person radicalised or in danger of being radicalised is under 18 years of 
age or has children who are still minors, and the non-institutional services offered to the 
family are not sufficient to secure the wellbeing of the child, young person or their family. 
Health care 
Radicalisation is not a health problem, so health care measures cannot be applied to it. 
However, preventive health care, for example, can promote the healthy development 
of children and young people and prevent or relieve behavioural and emotional 
disturbances. In addition, good treatment of mental disorders can affect broader 
developments that precede radicalisation. The purpose of health care services is to 
promote the health, wellbeing, operating capacity and social security of the population, 
i.e. their possibilities for involvement and participation. Promoting the wellbeing, 
operating capacity and participation of a health care patient also enhances the wellbeing 
of their friends and relatives and other people. Where necessary, health care services will 
collaborate with other authorities and also consult non-governmental organisations, such 
as activities increasing social participation.
In the education sector, the Ministry of Education and Culture and the Finnish National 
Agency for Education participate in the implementation of the National Action Plan and 
the operation of the National Cooperation Network. It is nationally important to secure 
and promote cooperation between the various parties, develop research-based working 
methods as well as promote the competence of the personnel in the education sector and 
early childhood education. The Finnish National Agency for Education plans, develops and 
organises training that strengthens competence as well as other measures together with 
regional administrative authorities. The education sector is involved in Anchor work.
The education sector and early childhood education support the integration of children 
and young people in society and can thus also strengthen factors that protect them from 
violent extremist radicalisation. Educational institutions are important partners in Anchor 
work and close cooperation is pursued with them. Teachers and school personnel reach 
the majority of young people and have the possibility to identify those in need of support 
and also the challenges concerning student welfare in general. 
In the education sector, goals, content and methods related to comprehensive prevention 
are based on national and international laws, plans and documents guiding education, 
including early childhood education plans and curricula, the criteria for degrees, the UN 
Declaration of Children’s Rights, the UN Declaration of Human Rights, the Act on Equality 
as well as the Non-Discrimination Act. Their effectiveness is enhanced through basic and 
supplementary education for actors in the education sector as well as by developing the 
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operating and discussion culture in educational institutions.  The education sector also 
plays an important role in preventing topical social phenomena, such as racism and hate 
speech.
Cultural services have many important tasks in view of preventing violent radicalisation 
and extremism. Culture offers viewpoints and solutions that strengthen European values, 
democracy and togetherness. Education and culture provide a basis for active citizenship. 
Of the cultural actors, libraries as well as museums can promote debate and interaction 
between cultures and groups through exhibitions and events. Inclusive activities have 
increased in museums, through which different groups can be brought together in a safe 
environment, thus increasing understanding of different cultures and offering information 
instead of propaganda and hate speech. Arts and cultural services and related leisure-
time activities promote the integration of immigrants and help people interact and do 
things together, which is necessary for their integration. These services are an effective 
way of introducing immigrants to Finnish culture. In addition, the availability of literature 
in languages understood by immigrants is ensured through cultural policy means. Cultural 
activities can also mitigate the factors leading to the social exclusion of children and 
young people, such as the lack of friends and pastimes, and increase their trust in their 
personal capabilities. 
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for Finland’s foreign and security policy. 
In this role, it contributes to dealing with questions related to violent radicalisation and 
extremism as part of counter-terrorism measures in international cooperation. The key 
venues for international cooperation are the United Nations, the Council of Europe and 
the OSCE. Important in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism is respect 
for human rights and international treaties. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible 
for Finland’s international human rights policy. Religious leaders and dialogue between 
religions also play an important role in preventing violent radicalisation and extremism, 
and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs promotes such dialogue as part of efforts towards 
strengthening peace. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs participates in the work of the 
National Cooperation Network. 
Young people from different backgrounds are encountered in youth work. Violent 
radicalisation and extremism pose a major threat to young people’s wellbeing and future, 
and violently radicalised young people have a negative effect on the wellbeing and safety 
and security of other young people around them. In youth work, it may be possible to 
detect at an early stage young people who show an interest in violent extremist actions 
and extremist movements. It also allows identifying changes taking place in young people 
and intervening in such development through positive means and supporting them. 
Young people who are becoming absorbed by violent extremist ideas and engaged in the 
activities of extremist movements can also be encountered in outreach work. Municipal 
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youth services are involved in Anchor work in some areas.  It is possible to carry out 
measures in youth work that strengthen young people’s involvement in society, media 
literacy and the ability to counter violence-inducing propaganda and recruitment to 
extremist movements. 
In prison administration, it is possible to identify prisoners who are radicalising their 
inmates and to support prisoners and those serving a community sanction who have 
become or are becoming subject to the influence of violent extremism. The risks faced 
by releasing prisoners due to the threat of violent extremism or terrorism can be reduced 
through actions taken by the prison administration during imprisonment.  
The Finnish Defence Forces receives tens of thousands of young men of enlisting 
age as well as hundreds of women and reservists every year. In this sense, the Finnish 
Defence Forces has the possibility to detect possible signs of violent radicalisation as 
well as provide information on violent extremist activities and the threat to society and 
individuals. The Finnish Defence Forces is an important actor in local cooperation to 
prevent violent radicalisation. 
Reception centres deal with people who face an uncertain future. These people often 
come from areas where there is a lot of violence and hate speech. They follow the situation 
and events in those areas, and these may have an effect on their health, behaviour and 
reactions. Reception centres offer statutory reception services to asylum seekers as well as 
other reception services in an equal, professional manner, seeking to support and sustain 
the asylum seekers’ ability to cope in a challenging situation in life and thus possibly 
avoiding the creation of extreme reactions.  Services and activities for asylum seekers 
are also arranged outside of reception centres by private, public and organisational 
actors. Reception centres refer asylum seekers to outside services and coordinate 
everything offered by the services and activities. Guiding reception centre customers 
towards positive participation in society reduces the risk of violent radicalisation. 
Through their observations, reception centre customers can help the personnel identify 
individuals who are at risk of being radicalised. The Finnish Immigration Service (Migri) 
is responsible for guiding, planning and monitoring practical operations in reception 
centres. The representative of the Finnish Immigration Service is a member of the National 
Cooperation Network. 
Non-governmental organisations provide services and activities that play a key role in 
the prevention of violent extremism. People attracted to extremism and having joined 
extremist groups do not usually trust the authorities, so it is easier for them to use services 
provided by non-governmental organisations. These provide services that help people 
disengage from violence, mentoring and other care services that promote breaking free 
from ideologies that promote violence. They offer channels for influencing society without 
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violence and strengthen people’s sense of equality and participation. It is easier for non-
governmental organisations than the authorities to contact groups that are difficult to 
reach and support their participation in society. 
5.3 Tasks of other parties of relevance to prevention 
Politicians and decision-makers have the power to decide how and in which direction 
Finnish society will develop. They play an important role in defining values that guide 
the direction of development. Policy sectors important for the prevention of violent 
extremism and radicalisation include education, social, health, employment, integration 
and housing policy. Successful policy measures in these fields reduce the breeding ground 
for violent radicalisation and extremism. Politicians and decision-makers influence public 
opinion and attitudes about violent extremism through their own example. Politicians 
can, through their actions, comments and example, reduce or increase hate speech, 
discrimination, social confrontation, equality and the implementation of other statutory 
rights as well as aspects that, in turn, either increase or reduce violent radicalisation in 
society. Politicians and decision-makers have power, they are opinion leaders and have 
considerable responsibility for preventing violent radicalisation and extremism. 
Religious communities are experts and credible actors in matters related to the 
interpretation of religion. They can support individuals and groups who counter 
recruitment to violent groups. Religious communities play an important role in 
strengthening the immunity of communities against messages that encourage violence. 
They can together act against violence and spread information showing that hate and 
violence cannot be justified through religion. Religious communities are the target of 
violent extremist groups. They are subjected to violence, threat of violence, malicious 
acts, hate speech and even the threat of terrorism. Religious communities can support 
community members and increase their own capabilities to combat the threats 
imposed on them by violent extremism by collaborating with the authorities and non-
governmental organisations. 
Business sector. Violent extremism affects companies in many ways. Companies may 
do things that promote violent radicalisation. A good example of this is the spreading of 
material related to violent extremism or offering space for arranging events that promote 
violent radicalisation and extremism. Companies can take the prevention of violent 
radicalisation into consideration in their operations and services. Customers today pay 
more attention to the responsible operations of companies, and responsibility in efforts 
to promote social order and safety and security and to prevent violent radicalisation can 
be a strength for companies as well as a factor enhancing their reputation. According to 
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international experiences, the increased activities of violent extremist groups affects the 
competitiveness of companies, especially in small locations. This can, for example, hamper 
the recruitment of skilled personnel from overseas. A location where violent extremist 
groups operate openly and visibly seldom appears as a safe and desirable place to live. 
This also affects business activities. The aim of violent extremist groups is to increase 
confrontation between different people and groups of people who have different views, 
which may also be seen inside companies. 
Family and friends may be in a position to prevent radicalisation. Social networks play 
an important role in violent radicalisation. Violent radicalisation may also occur without 
the family noticing it as violent extremist groups often insist that the individual engaged 
in their activities cuts all ties with people outside the group, including family and friends.  
The aim is that the individual is both physically and mentally fully dependent on the 
violent group and has no social contacts outside of it. A family member can be lost to a 
violent extremist group. The radicalisation of a family member affects the wellbeing of the 
whole family and also increases the risk of their radicalisation. However, emotional ties 
are often strong and play an important role in preventing a person from joining a violent 
extremist group. Family and friends should be given extensive help, advice and support 
at an early stage so they can prevent a family member from joining a violent extremist 
group, and look after a family member who returns to the family after having been under 
the influence and involved in the activities of a violent extremist group. With support, it is 
possible to prevent the family from breaking their ties with society and its services. 
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6 Implementation, monitoring and 
reporting
The implementation of the Action Plan is coordinated by the Ministry of the Interior. 
Ministries and their branches of administration are obligated to implement the Action 
Plan, which is based on the Government resolution. The involvement of municipalities, 
non-governmental organisations and other parties in the implementation of measures 
decided in the Action Plan is based on principles of cooperation and joint objectives as 
well as, where necessary, separate agreements.
An implementation plan is prepared for the fulfilment and implementation of the 
objectives and measures decided in the Action Plan, describing how the entities 
and related measures set out in section 7 will be implemented, together with the 
implementation schedule and responsible parties. Each party engaged in the 
implementation prepares a preliminary plan for the measures in the implementation it 
participates in or the implementation of which it is responsible for. The plans and activities 
are combined and prioritised by the National Cooperation Network.
The implementation plan is confirmed in the Ministerial Working Group on Internal 
Security and Strengthening the Rule of Law.
The progress of the implementation is annually reported to the Ministerial Working Group, 
and it is revised and complemented in connection with the reporting, where necessary. 
Organisations participating in the implementation are responsible for preparing an 
implementation plan for their actions and producing the necessary information for 
reporting. The report is prepared by the National Cooperation Network.  
Organisations participating in the implementation ensure that information on the Action 
Plan, its implementation and their implementation responsibilities is disseminated 
within the organisation and the administrative branch to all experts, supervisors and 
management of relevance to implementation. 
35
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2020:3 NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT RADICALISATION AND EXTREMISM 2019–2023
7 Objectives and measures 
The general objectives of prevention have been decided under the National Action Plan 
for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism until 2023.  Achieving the 
objectives requires actions from all the parties engaged in the implementation of the 
Action Plan. 
Objectives have been set and measures determined for achieving the overall goals for 
cross-border entities implemented by different actors. These were selected on account of 
their current relevance. Achieving the objectives of the entities set out in section 7.2 and 
implementing measures call for joint efforts from the various actors. The actor indicated 
as the responsible party (party responsible for launching the operation in bold) is 
responsible for ensuring that key actors in the matter are engaged in implementing 
the measures. 
The objectives and measures set out in section 7.2 are based on the development needs 
observed in the assessment of the National Action Plan that was completed in 2016. In the 
assessment, situations where the responsibility for a person or matter transfers from one 
actor to another were identified as challenges. Although such transition phases and the 
related development need have been recognised, the focus on developing prevention is 
primarily on enhancing the operation of each actor, not on improving the joint process. 
Therefore, it is important to develop the work of these entities in which productive 
operations call for collaboration between different actors and securing the activities in 
transition phases. 
The objectives and measures of the key implementation organisations are described 
in section 7.3 of the Action Plan. Prepared by the actors themselves, they are measures 
needed to help the organisations strengthen their operations in the context of preventing 
violent radicalisation and extremism. Developing the operations of the organisations 
is also important so they can better implement the objectives and measures set out in 
section 7.2 of the Action Plan. 
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It can be stated by way of conclusion that the objectives and measures of the Action Plan 
consist of three parts. The general objectives in section 7.1 describe the overall goals of 
the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism, and their achievement will be 
assessed in 2023. The objectives and measures of the entities in section 7.2 describe the 
key areas of operations in which the goals set must be achieved and the implementation 
of which calls for joint efforts among the various actors. Section 7.3 lists the objectives 
and measures the key actors participating in the implementation have set for the 
development of their operations and administrative branch in the prevention of violent 
radicalisation and extremism. To some degree, the implementation of these measures 
calls for cooperation with other actors and the assessment of legislation. The 
implementation of the measures set out in sections 7.2 and 7.3 are reported and revised 
on an annual basis. 
7.1 General objectives of the Action Plan
The goal of the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and 
Extremism is to:
1. Reduce extremist violence and the threat of it. 
2. Promote the implementation of equality, freedom of speech and 
other constitutional rights. 
3. Ensure that structures and procedures based on multi-professional 
cooperation and allowing the authorities, non-governmental 
organisations and communities to prevent violent radicalisation and 
extremism are available nationally, regionally and locally. 
4. Detect and investigate efficiently hate crime, including punishable 
hate crime deemed to meet the criteria of a crime. Combat speech 
that violates human dignity and prohibited under the Non-
Discrimination Act, as well as harassment prohibited under the Act 
on Equality. Support victims and identify the impacts of hate crime 
and illegal speech and harassment on the victim’s reference group. 
5. Decrease the impacts of violent extremist movements on local 
communities and environments. 
6. People living in Finland, especially young people, consider 
influencing society and decision-making through legal means 
effective and meaningful. The view of the world and actions 
of violent extremist movements do not appear an attractive 
alternative. 
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7. The knowledge of the authorities and non-governmental 
organisations for the prevention of violent extremism increases. 
7.2 Objectives and measures of cross-sectoral entities
The objectives and measures of the cross-sectoral entities of different actors are presented 
below. The responsibility for launching the measures and shared effort as well as reporting 
results lies with the organisation indicated as the responsible party, which must ensure 
that relevant actors are involved in the operations. 
7.2.1 Preventing violent extremism and radicalisation locally
Local prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism is very important. Individuals and 
groups become radicalised and operate locally and are part of local social networks and 
communities. Violent extremist groups locally influence the safety and security and sense 
of security of people and communities. Violent extremist groups make efficient use of local 
incidents and create their own interpretations about them that support their ideology 
and goals and spread the interpretations especially through social media. This multiplies 
the consequences and effects of individual incidents locally, especially if the matter is not 
reacted to quickly and efficiently. Effective local prevention of violent radicalisation and 
extremism calls for cooperation between different authorities and with non-governmental 
organisations as well as including young people, women and religious communities in the 
operations, sustaining a knowledge-based overview, training different actors, introducing 
broad preventive measures as well as effective, correctly timed interventions and referring 
individuals who have been or are in danger of being radicalised to the necessary services. 
The current state and development needs of local operations are described in the Ministry 
of the Interior’s report 17/19 ”Observations and Recommendations for Local Collaboration 
on Referral Mechanism of Persons of Concern in Local Multi-Stakeholder Collaboration 
for Preventing Violent Radicalisation”. The report also includes a description of how local 
operations have been organised in some countries. Local operations have also been 
discussed in the assessment report of the National Action Plan 201620.
20  Assessment of the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism of the 
Ministry of the Interior. Ministry of the Interior publications, 18/2019.
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Objectives 
The aim is to locally prevent, together with the authorities and with non-governmental 
organisations the radicalisation of individuals and groups and their involvement in the 
activities of violent extremist movements. In addition, measures are taken to combat 
and prevent the impacts of violent extremist movements on people’s living and 
residential environments as well as on their security and sense of security. The work 
takes account of the activities of extremist movements in social media21, owing to which 
the authorities and non-governmental organisations increase their presence in social 
media. Ensuring that violently radicalised individuals or those in danger of radicalisation 
are referred to services provided by the authorities and other actors that assist them in 
rejecting violence22. Intervening with factors that promote violent radicalisation, such as 
confrontation, punishable hate speech, racism and discrimination. Increasing knowledge 
of the ways in which municipalities can reduce violent radicalisation and the impact of 
factors increasing extremism as part of the basic work done by their subdivisions. Utilising 
the information produced by and cooperation opportunities offered by universities and 
other research institutes in local work. 
Measures 
1. Promoting and disseminating information on Anchor work. In multi-
professional Anchor work, the police, social worker, psychiatric 
nurse, education officer and often the youth worker work with 
young people who have committed symptomatic crime, with 
the aim of breaking the cycle of crime and ending behaviour 
harmful to the child’s or young person’s future as early as possible. 
Anchor customers also include persons whose challenge is violent 
radicalisation23. The target group of Anchor work is children and 
young people under 18 years of age. There is no upper age limit in 
cases connected with violent radicalisation, and adult social work also 
participates in the operations in the case of customers aged 18 years 
or older.  Anchor work serves as a contact point that other authorities 
and actors as well as citizens can contact if they have concerns about 
violently radicalised individuals or families. Supporting Anchor 
work and its development through local means as described in the 
21  Some extremist movements still operate through traditional websites and blogs as well as channels such as 
ylilauta.org, or through P2P services in addition to social media platforms, including Facebook and Twitter.
22  The services refer to Anchor work and authorities’ services that deal with factors underlying radicalisation.
23  The prevention of violent radicalisation was added to the work of the Anchor teams in the National Action Plan 
for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism 2016.
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Anchor manual24 . Disseminating information on Anchor work to 
different authorities, non-governmental organisations and religious 
communities. Responsible parties: Ministry of the Interior, Ministry 
of Social Affairs and Health, Ministry of Education and Culture, 
National Police Board, the Finnish National Agency for Education, the 
Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare.
2. Ensuring referral to services from tip-off to support. Introducing 
the operating model presented in the report ”Observations about 
the case management interface and recommendations for the 
development of operations”25 in all parts of the country through 
operations guidance, management, training and disseminating 
information. The operating model is described in Appendix 2 of 
the Action Plan. The aim of the model is to ensure that in a case of 
concern the person is referred to services, through collaboration 
between the authorities, that will help them reject violent 
radicalisation and extremism. Essential from the point of view of 
successful referral to services is smooth, permanent cooperation 
and the access of the receiving party to sufficient resources for 
producing the service. In addition to the existing services, Exit 
services customised for this target group should be developed. 
Responsible parties: Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Health, Ministry of Education and Culture, National 
Police Board, police departments, the Finnish National Agency for 
Education, the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare. 
3. Arranging training for the Anchor teams and other collaborating 
actors for promoting cooperation. Arranging training that promotes 
competence, cooperation and exchange of information between 
different actors. Responsible parties: Ministry of the Interior 
together with the national Anchor steering group, authorities 
responsible for the operations of local Anchor teams. 
4. Procedures for receiving feedback. Procedures are introduced 
through which persons providing tips receive confirmation 
indicating that the tip has reached the recipient and has been 
taken into consideration, within the framework of legislation. It is 
important to inform the person providing the tip that the tip will 
be reacted to even if this does not take place in a visible manner. 
Gathering summary data about the operations and processing 
24  Anchor manual. Ministry of the Interior publications, 21/2019.
25  Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:17.
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it together with the relevant parties to develop the operations. 
Responsible parties: Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice, 
National Police Board, police departments.
5. Continuing the work of the existing cooperation networks and 
establishing local cooperation networks in locations where they 
do not yet exist and that need such operations based on the local 
overview and threat assessment. Clarifying the objectives and tasks 
of the networks and revising their composition, where necessary, 
based on good experiences about the work done so far as well 
as international good practices. Developing the operations so 
that the role of cities and municipalities in the operations of the 
cooperation networks becomes more prominent in accordance 
with international good practices and that authorities and non-
governmental organisations of relevance to preventing violent 
radicalisation as well as the representatives of other actors are 
engaged in the work. Strengthening regional cooperation when 
the threats and phenomena related to violent radicalisation cross 
municipal boundaries. Ensuring that information on the operations 
of the cooperation network and the services it produces, such 
as a common overview, training and other work promoting the 
prevention of violent radicalisation, is broadly disseminated to local 
actors and communities. Ensuring cooperation with Anchor work by 
introducing an expert engaged in the Anchor scheme as a member 
of the network. Responsible parties: Parties responsible for the 
operations of local cooperation networks. 
An example of the tasks of the local cooperation network: 
 − Creating a regional overview based on information from all the par-
ticipating actors, and updating and maintaining it regularly by the 
parties engaged in the cooperation network.
 − Securing, through coordinated collaboration that the operations are 
at the level required by the overview, all relevant actors are enga-
ged in the work and competence and expertise are developed and 
disseminated in the area. It is important that every actor recognises 
their responsibility, task and role in the work and understands how 
the work is related to their basic task.
 − Annually determining concrete objectives and measures based 
on an overview in order to direct the operations according to the 
region’s challenges and characteristics.
 − Improving the flow of information and consistent communication 
about violent radicalisation and extremism.
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 − Creating a model/process on the basis of which the local actors can 
contact parties of relevance to the operations (referring to services) 
in case of concern about the radicalisation of a person or group.
 − Improving the wellbeing, security and sense of security of the muni-
cipality’s residents.
6. Increasing dialogue and interaction. Arranging local events in 
which different groups can enter into dialogue with each other. 
Promoting interaction increases knowledge and understanding 
between groups, which is crucial to preventing the expansion of 
confrontation, polarisation and the breeding ground for violent 
extremism. The events can also take a broadly visible form, such 
as peace walks with representatives from different religions. 
Responsible parties: Local authorities and non-governmental 
organisations together with local cooperation networks. 
7. Supporting the extension of the Show Racism the Red Card project in 
football and other team sports as well as the visibility of the project 
in sports events. Continuing to support projects that promote 
equality in sports. Responsible parties: Ministry of Education and 
Culture, non-governmental organisations. 
8. Arranging sports events with the aim of building trust and 
promoting dialogue between communities in case of controversy. 
Strengthening dialogue between local communities and preventing 
controversy through the Peace United football and peace building 
concept. Peace United supports local conflict resolution and acts 
as a trust building tool in Finland and globally. Responsible parties: 
Finn Church Aid and the Network for Religious and Traditional 
Peacemakers together with the National Cooperation Network 
and local cooperation groups.
9. Promoting the competence of persons with a key role in the 
operations to identify polarisation and dismantle polarisation 
development. The aim is to increase knowledge of polarisation and 
its dynamics and introduce experts specialised in polarisation who 
are capable of acting and supporting other actors in a situation 
where confrontation is aggravated and the activities of violent 
extremist groups and their hate speech increases. Responsible 
parties: Local cooperation groups and non-governmental 
organisations involved in them. 
10. Improving the ability of the authorities to identify violent 
radicalisation and assess the related threat. Developing a risk 
assessment model for use by and supporting cooperation between 
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municipalities and other authorities, making use of the risk 
assessment method developed by the Danish Centre for Prevention 
of Extremism26. The purpose of the model is to assess the risk of 
violent radicalisation at an early stage, taking into consideration the 
individual’s strengths and risk factors. It is thus well suited for use by 
municipal employees, for example. Responsible parties: Ministry of 
Social Affairs and Health, Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare. 
11. Strengthening the resilience of children and young people. 
Supporting the deployment of Teaching Controversial Issues and 
Dembra materials of the Council of Europe (the Finnish National 
Agency for Education supports the deployment of the above 
two programmes) and linking them with the Free to speak – 
Safe to Learn campaign of the Council of Europe as well as the 
dissemination of the Minun Silmin, Sinun Silmin (MiSi; I See You See) 
programme. Responsible parties: The Finnish National Agency for 
Education, local cooperation networks and groups. 
12. Strengthening the participation of the business sector and 
companies in local efforts to prevent violent radicalisation. Among 
others, companies can contribute to the implementation of 
campaigns that prevent violent radicalisation at an early stage by 
combatting hate speech and instigation to violence and promote 
positive interaction, dialogue and understanding between different 
population groups. Responsible parties: local cooperation 
networks and groups together with local companies. 
7.2.2 Strengthening the participation of young people in the prevention of 
violent extremism and radicalisation
Violent radicalisation and extremism as well as the activities of extremist movements 
are seen in young people’s everyday lives in many ways. They can also take the form of 
racism and discrimination, hate speech especially in social media, and as threats, insults 
and exclusion. The social atmosphere and polarisation can be seen in young people’s 
behaviour as confrontation and aggravated interaction characterised by black-and-
white opinions in classrooms and other situations where young people get together. 
Acts of violence related to terrorism and violent extremism arouse fear in children and 
young people, impairing their wellbeing and sense of security. The impacts of violent 
radicalisation and extremism in the lives of children and young people are especially 
26  Permission has been requested and received from the Danish Centre for Prevention of Extremism for using the 
assessment method.
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problematic when they do not have the chance to process the matters in a safe 
environment before the situations become aggravated. It should be noted, however, that 
not all children and young people come across the phenomenon in the same way. Its 
impacts vary according to locality, city district and school, and may differ according to the 
backgrounds of the children and young people in question. 
It is difficult for young people to outline and understand discussion about violent 
radicalisation, extremism and extremist movements and how it relates to other 
phenomena, such as confrontation, polarisation, hate speech and racism. It may also be 
challenging to identify the relationship of cause and effect, especially if the matter is not 
discussed under the safe guidance of adults. 
The capabilities, willingness and skills of people working with children and young people 
to process difficult, controversial topics is essential in view of the impacts of violent 
radicalisation, extremism and other related phenomena27.
There are also families in Finland in which children are brought up to accept violence and 
violations of human rights in accordance with the ideology of extremist movements. In 
addition, there are families where the parents’ racist, discriminatory opinions are passed 
on to the next generation. Young people are subjected to propaganda and recruitment by 
violent extremist groups. Adolescence is a stage in life when individuals are open to new 
influences and are looking for direction and meaning in their lives. At this point, they can 
also be a fruitful target for influence that can prove very negative, even dangerous to their 
future. 
Young people are a major resource in preventing violent radicalisation and extremism as 
well as building peace and reducing confrontation. They can support other young people 
and make use of their experiences and expertise in preventive work. 
The participation of young people in the prevention of violent radicalisation and 
extremism has been outlined in the UN Secretary-General’s Plan of Action to Prevent 
Violent Extremism (2016) and the goals of the UN Resolution 2250. 
Objectives
The goal is for young people to be involved in the planning and implementation 
of measures to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism. The opportunities 
27  Questions related to education, for instance, are discussed in the Ministry of the Interior publication Sanat ovat 
Tekoja, 17 May 2019. Enhancing actions against hate speech and online bullying.
44
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2020:3
and capabilities of young people to participate in the operations are increased by 
strengthening their competence and possibilities to influence in everyday questions of 
peace and security. Their involvement is based on their own actions, supported by the 
authorities and other adults, where necessary. 
Measures
1. Creating safe venues for discussion. Young people want and must be 
given opportunities to talk with adults about violent radicalisation 
and extremism and the related phenomena. Adults make sure that 
venues and opportunities for such dialogue are available to young 
people. Any subject can be talked about, and it is for the adults to 
keep the discussions safe and lead them in the right direction on 
the basis of democracy and respect for human rights. Responsible 
parties: Professionals working with young people (e.g. the 
education sector and youth work).
2. Promoting the use of plain language when talking about 
phenomena. The ability of adults to use concepts related to 
violent radicalisation and extremism correctly and to specify the 
phenomenon is increased through training and support material. 
Responsible parties: Professionals working with and meeting 
young people, Expert network on extremist ideas and resilience 
coordinated by the Faculty of Educational Sciences, the 
University of Helsinki.
3. Involving young people in planning and implementing measures 
to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism. Making sure that 
young people can contribute to planning and implementing 
measures to combat violent radicalisation and extremism nationally, 
regionally and locally. It is for the authorities to invite young people 
to contribute to these efforts. Responsible parties: Ministry of the 
Interior, Ministry of Education and Culture, the Finnish National 
Agency for Education, local cooperation groups. 
4. Strengthening young people’s competence and possibilities of 
influence in everyday questions of peace and security by organising 
the Reach Out peace academy, which brings together young people 
from different backgrounds who are interested in peace work 
and social influence. The Reach Out peace academy offers young 
people tools to operate at the local level, in their daily lives and in 
collaboration with other actors to prevent violent radicalisation, 
extremism and conflicts. Responsible parties: Finn Church Aid 
and the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers 
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together with the National Cooperation Network.  Use is made of 
the expertise of the Changemaker network and local networks in 
organising the Academy.
5. Clarifying the content and objectives of democracy education. 
Democracy education is included in the foundations of the 
curriculum, though its content should be developed so that young 
people can understand democracy and its principles more easily. 
The measure can be implemented as part of the preparation of 
the democracy programme across branches of administration, as 
decided in the 2019 Government programme. Responsible parties: 
Ministry of Education and Culture, the Finnish National Agency 
for Education.
6. Making sure that young people receive help with mental health 
problems. In some cases, violent radicalisation has to do with mental 
health disorders. However, the question is not of a specific illness, 
nor does any illness cause radicalisation. It is important to improve 
the availability of mental health services for young people so that 
they can receive help with mental health problems quickly and at 
the right time before the illness can contribute to the development 
of radicalisation. Being influenced by violent extremist ideas and 
engaged in such activities can aggravate problems related to the 
mental health of young people. Responsible parties: Social and 
health services, Anchor teams.
7. Arranging round table discussions between young people and the 
authorities. Young people may often consider the authorities distant 
and their impression about the police, for instance, can be based on 
their friends’ opinions or stories posted in social media. Arranging 
regular discussions with young people and increasing their 
knowledge about the operations of the authorities and the reasons 
for such operations. Responsible parties: Various authorities, local 
cooperation groups. 
8. Promoting low-threshold sports activities open to everyone. Sports 
and physical exercise are an effective way of bringing together 
young people who do not usually do things together and thus 
reduce tension, hostility and prejudice between different groups. 
Creating opportunities for low-threshold sports activities open to 
everyone so that young people can meet each other. The aim is to 
introduce activities that reduce prejudice towards young people 
representing different groups and also offer opportunities to talk 
about difficult themes. In addition, developing non-discrimination 
and equality work in sports and supporting anti-racism activities 
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(Show Racism the Red Card). Responsible parties: Ministry of 
Education and Culture, local cooperation groups, youth work, 
sports clubs, non-governmental organisations and volunteers 
working with young people. 
9. Improving the ability of the authorities interacting with and 
encountering young people through the internet as well as that of 
volunteers to prevent violent radicalisation. Young people interested 
in violent extremist movements and their activities are encountered 
in youth and police work on the internet. Improving the awareness 
and ability of the actors to identify violent extremist movements 
and their activities. Improving the competence of authorities and 
volunteers encountering young people to enter into discussions 
with young people in which the ideology of violent extremist 
movements is questioned on the basis of facts. Responsible parties: 
Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Education and Culture, 
National Police Board, Save the Children.
7.2.3 Identifying and combatting recruitment into the activities of violent 
extremist groups 
Violent extremist groups recruit and enroll supporters as well as new members and actors 
over the internet, at events arranged outside of the internet as well as through social 
networks. Recruitment takes place in social media or through discussions taking place in 
connection with online games, for examples. According to research, only a few people 
become radicalised solely as a result of propaganda spreading over the internet, though 
some cases are known where this has happened. However, the large-scale consumption 
of terrorist propaganda may lower the threshold for committing a violent attack28. Social 
networks play an important role in joining the activities of violent extremist groups. Many of 
the individuals who travelled from Finland to the conflict areas in Syria and Iraq after 2012 
have had friends or relatives who have also travelled there. It is estimated that in Finland the 
importance of social networks in making the travel decision is especially prominent29. 
Recruitment into the activities of violent extremist groups can take place in and around 
premises where persons belonging to the target group are present. Premises intended 
for sports and youth work as well as the surroundings of schools are examples of places 
where recruitment attempts have been observed. It can be stated on the basis of the 
available information that recruitment seldom takes place on the premises of religious 
28  For example, see the Turku stabbings 18 August 2018. Report by the Safety Investigation Authority, P2017-01. 
Chapter 2.2.1.
29  Jihadism in Finland. Malkki & Saarinen. Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:14.
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groups. However, such actions have been observed in their surroundings as well as in 
private apartments.
Emotions play an important role in violent radicalisation. Different violent extremist 
groups use similar methods to recruit new supporters and members. Manipulation is 
an essential part of recruitment, and so are conspiracy theories and narratives (stories) 
presented to justify the activities and the use of violence. The aim is to affect people’s 
emotions and the desire to be accepted, to be part of something bigger and a member 
of a group. Strengthening experiences of injustice is another important way of attracting 
supporters of violent ideologies and activities. 
A fairly heterogeneous group of people participate in far-right and anti-immigration 
activities. Middle-aged and older persons are strongly represented, especially in the street 
protest groups that originated in the autumn 2015. The Nordic Resistance Movement30 
and Soldiers of Odin also appeal to younger people. Social media has been the key 
channel for spreading their activities. The groups give out information about their 
presence and activities on the internet and seek to attract new members through social 
networking services. The activities are coordinated over the internet. Journalistically 
edited media can promote recruitment to far-right activities by disseminating information 
about their activities in connection with news and mainstreaming the propaganda of 
violent extremist groups by introducing concepts they are using. The activities of the 
groups have been visible in journalistically edited media especially since 2015. The groups, 
especially those continuing the activities of the Nordic Resistance Movement, disseminate 
materials in public spaces. Its representatives have also networked internationally into 
operating environments made up by music sub-cultures, for example. Finnish White Power 
bands perform in different parts of the world, including the United States and Europe. 
Similar return visits have also been made at least in Europe. Social networks and personal 
relations also play a role in joining violent far-right activities. 
There has been fairly little violent non-parliamentary far left and anarchistic activity in 
Finland in the last few years, and no research-based information is available on how 
people join the activities of these groups. According to existing research, it seems that 
global events as well as political and social development play a role in how attractive 
direct action is considered. Investigations have shown that the financial crisis of 2008 and 
its consequences as well as the increased visibility of the Nordic Resistance Movement 
have contributed to the activeness of the activities in Finland31. 
30  The case of prohibiting the activities of the Nordic Resistance Movement is currently being processed in the 
Supreme Court.
31  Suoraa toimintaa! Monti & Purokuru 2018.
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Objectives
The aim is to ensure that professionals have enough up-to-date information so they 
can identify the emblems, symbols, propaganda and recruitment methods of violent 
extremist movements. Identifying the connection of hate speech to violent radicalisation 
and extremism. Identifying situations and channels in which recruitment takes place 
and intervening in the activities. Supporting the individual subject to recruitment with 
the aim of preventing them from becoming influenced by violent extremist activities. 
Strengthening the capabilities of people working with adults to identify individuals and 
families affected by violent extremism and enhancing their ability to offer services that 
help individuals reject violent ideology. 
Measures
1. Increasing professionals’ knowledge concerning the emblems and 
symbols of violent extremist groups. Increasing knowledge by 
preparing inserts, through training and providing videos and other 
support material, for instance. The aim is that professionals have 
sufficient information so they can identify emblems and symbols 
and discuss with young people especially the types of activities 
dangerous to safety and security, wellbeing and social order they 
are related to. Responsible parties: Ministry of Education and 
Culture, the Finnish National Agency for Education, Ministry 
of the Interior, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, the Finnish 
Institute for Health and Welfare, the police.  
2. Identifying and removing recruitment material, such as labels and 
other materials. Increasing the knowledge of cities, municipalities, 
resident associations, sports clubs, teachers and other people 
working with young people about the material disseminated 
by violent extremist movements and removing it from the 
surroundings of schools, for instance. Responsible parties: Local 
cooperation groups together with civil society, people responsible 
for premises where recruitment takes place. 
3. Ensuring that premises maintained through public financing are not 
used for activities whose aim is to promote confrontation between 
different population groups and instigate people to hate and 
violence. Agreeing on procedures through which parties renting out 
municipal premises have enough up-to-date information on groups 
engaged in violent activities so that publicly funded premises 
are not used for activities that endanger the rights established in 
the Constitution. The authorities have the statutory obligation to 
promote equality, and the activities of violent extremist groups 
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are opposed to equality. Responsible parties: Local cooperation 
groups, authorities responsible for renting out facilities. 
4. Increasing information about the methods and practices used in 
recruitment. Increasing the knowledge of people working with 
young people as well as other professionals meeting individuals at 
risk of radicalisation about the methods used in inducing people to 
engage in violent extremism (such as grooming for extremism and 
terrorism). Enhancing the capabilities of professionals to intervene 
in a situation and support the person subject to grooming. 
Responsible parties: Professionals meeting young people and 
adults. 
5. Developing a recruitment monitoring and analysis method 
together with the authorities and researchers. Responsible parties: 
Ministry of the Interior, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, 
researchers.
7.2.4 Combatting terrorist propaganda and punishable hate speech 
The channels for disseminating terrorist propaganda are more powerful than before, 
the amount of propaganda has increased and its quality has improved. The terrorist 
organisation ISIL in particular has become known for its versatile media strategy that 
makes use of novel digital media tools through which it has targeted its message 
according to the needs of different audiences and maximised people’s awareness of its 
”brand”. Especially the production and use of shocking and violent videos has been part 
of ISIL’s communications for a long time32. This has led to counter-measures. Social media 
platforms have begun to remove terrorist propaganda and hate speech more effectively, 
the authorities have intensified their operations and the EU has also launched an initiative 
intended to remove terrorist propaganda33 and that is currently being processed by the 
European Parliament.
Social media always comes up as a channel for disseminating terrorist propaganda and 
hate speech. However, such messages can also be disseminated through journalistically 
edited media and traditional websites. This gives people committing terrorist attacks 
and extremist groups the attention they are after, which always also offers the possibility 
to disseminate propaganda. The target group of journalistically edited media is much 
broader than just those interested in the activities of violent extremist groups. It thus 
forms a channel for disseminating messages to a broad audience. The word choices 
32  Jihadist online communication and Finland. Malkki & Saarinen. Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:15.
33  July 2019.
50
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2020:3
used in journalistically edited media play an important role. For example, the ISIL 
propaganda agency Amaq has claimed to be a news agency in the same way as Reuters, 
which made its messages appear convincing and obscured the propagandistic nature 
of the information disseminated through it. The Muslim population especially is highly 
dissatisfied with journalistically edited media, which is often seen as strengthening 
negative stereotypes about Muslims through its story and image choices. 
Hate speech is linked with violent radicalisation and in spreading the activities of 
extremist groups. Hate speech increases insecurity and reduces the sense of security, 
increases the feeling of being an outsider and divides people into “us” and “them” – friends 
and enemies – thus strengthening confrontation. Hate speech creates a breeding ground 
for and promotion of the factors underlying violent radicalisation. Combatting hate 
speech is challenging. It is spread over the internet and social media services produced 
by companies in different countries. Countries differ in terms of how hate speech is 
treated in their legislation, and there is no single international definition of hate speech. 
In public debate, drawing a line between speech acceptable under freedom of speech 
and speech fulfilling the criteria of crime is often considered difficult. One reason for this 
is that extremist actors and groups actively work against combatting hate speech, which 
for them is an important way of increasing confrontation between different groups and 
mistrust towards the authorities and institutions. Combatting hate speech is also largely 
affected by the importance that politicians and decision-makers attach to combatting 
hate speech and how much resources the authorities have for combatting it. 
Terrorist propaganda and hate speech make extensive use of repeated narratives34 by 
way of justifying a threat, their own activities and the violence related to them. These 
narratives spread globally. The narratives of violent non-parliamentary far right and 
religiously motivated extremism share a lot in common and make similar use of people’s 
emotions, fears and uncertainties. To make the narratives appear convincing, they are 
essentially devised to create a shadow of suspicion in the recipient’s mind. They cannot 
be completely invalidated, however, as there may be a single case confirming the story or 
narrative is at least partly true. Hate speech advances gradually. First, suspicion is aroused, 
which is then maintained and spread and followed by exhaustive hate speech that centres 
around insults, showing disdain towards and disparaging its target or target group35. 
34  A narrative means a narration or story that can be written or verbal. The original Finnish version of this Action 
Plan uses the word ”narratiivi”, even though it is not actually good Finnish. Using Finnish equivalents of the term 
can be misleading, as the term ”narratiivi” is broadly used in Finnish in this context.
35  Professor Jaana Hallamaa 12 February 2019.
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Examples of the narratives used by the violent non-parliamentary far right include 36 ”Our 
national identity is under threat”, which often also involves the population exchange 
conspiracy theory. According to the theory, the national identity and white race are being 
threatened by immigration. The narrative points out, among other things, that there are 
more people from other ethnic backgrounds in residential areas and schools than before 
and so the white race will gradually become a minority. The actual number of immigrants 
does not play a role in the narrative, as indicated by the fact that the person committing 
the terrorist attack in New Zealand37 used the narrative as a justification for his attack even 
though the Muslim population in New Zealand is very small. In the narrative ”We do not 
live in the way we should”, the idea is to strengthen the ”natural” roles and tasks of men 
and women. Men should be strong heads of the family, while women should foster their 
natural roles as mothers and giving birth to children. According to the narrative, the trends 
or parties guilty of the situation, which even causes a low birth rate among the white 
race, are multiculturality, feminism and the representatives of sexual minorities. A third 
key far-right narrative is based on the idea that immigrants are favoured at the cost of 
the majority population. It suggests that immigrants receive better benefits from society 
and are prioritised over the country’s ”own population”, blaming the government and 
municipal administration for this. 
In religiously motivated violent extremism, the ”Islam is under attack” narrative is crucial 
when the intention is to recruit the Muslim population living in Western countries. In 
activities outside of Western countries, local unfairness causing feelings of bitterness and 
injustice are referred to. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are considered examples of 
how Western countries try to conquer and suppress Muslim countries (Christian Western 
countries led by the United States, i.e. ”the Crusade narrative”). This narrative also involves 
the dual standards theme, according to which Western countries talk about human rights, 
for example, but, at the same time, violate these by allowing torture and letting thousands 
of innocent Muslim civilians die in different parts of the world. Another important 
narrative is ”Muslims can never succeed and live as accepted citizens in Western countries”. 
This is used to account for the misfortunes experienced by individuals, such as difficulties 
in finding a job. The narrative is also closely linked with the often heated debate about 
how Muslim women dress and scarf bans. It is difficult to challenge this narrative because, 
according to several investigations of Islamophobia, the Muslim population is subject to 
increased discrimination and threat of violence in Europe. ISIL cleverly uses this narrative 
in its propaganda, and the propaganda and hate speech spread by the far right support 
the key message of the narrative. The third narrative is connected with the ISIL caliphate 
and its collapse. The message of the narrative is ”The war is not over”. This is used to 
36  The stories of both far-right and religiously motivated extremism are based on discussions and materials 
published in the RAN network.
37  Terrorist attack against two mosques in Christchurch 15 March 2019.
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encourage followers to participate in combat in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Philippines 
or attack infidels in Western countries. The key message of the narrative is that god puts 
true believers to the test and the collapse of the caliphate was just a temporary setback. 
Opinions against hierarchy and leaders are emphasised in violent non-parliamentary 
far left ideology and narratives. Anti-fascists use narratives in order to limit the spread 
of fascist and far-right ideology and oppose all parties sympathising with the far right. 
The violent far left considers the global capitalist economic system the cause for social 
polarisation, inequality and environmental problems. Opposing capitalism is thus also 
linked with radical environmental activities.
The motives of acts committed by individuals acting alone can be related to different 
narratives and conspiracy theories. They often justify their actions with a manifesto or 
some other summary of their thoughts and motives for the acts. These are disseminated 
through different forums. The person who carried out the Mosque attack in New Zealand, 
for example, published a 74-page manifesto that was shared through Twitter and 8chan, 
for instance. The heading of the manifesto referred to the conspiracy theory about 
population exchange and included hate speech and symbols related to neo-Nazism. 
Objectives
Increasing the knowledge and understanding of the general public and professionals 
about communications related to violent extremism and hate speech. Broadly increasing 
knowledge about the key concepts and narratives used in communications and hate 
speech. Strengthening the ability of people working with young people to talk about 
propaganda and hate speech. 
Identifying and intervening with hate speech and supporting the victim of hate speech. 
Strengthening equality by intervening with all terrorist propaganda and hate speech 
in the same way regardless of their author. Increasing topic-related research, which 
produces more information on the types of material disseminated over the internet, 
how people react to, consume and understand it as well as how the material is treated in 
journalistically produced media. 
Measures
1. Strengthening the media literacy of adults. The media literacy of 
children and young people has been strengthened in the last few 
years, whereas fairly little has been done to improve that of adults. 
However, according to the police, hate speech is most commonly 
disseminated by men aged 30 years or over, and there are also 
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women in this group. Increasing the knowledge of adults about 
freedom of speech and its boundaries. Adults also play an important 
role in view of children’s media literacy, as the attitudes of parents to 
hate speech and racism are often passed on to the next generation. 
Responsible parties: Ministry of Education and Culture, the Finnish 
National Agency for Education, National Audiovisual Institute 
KAVI. 
2. Increasing knowledge and the ability to identify the concepts and 
narratives used by extremist groups. Preparing training material 
and related support material for different occupational groups and 
the general public. Responsible parties: Ministry of the Interior, 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Ministry of Education and 
Culture, Ministry of Justice, Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare.
3. Increasing research-based information on narratives and the types 
of material disseminated over the internet, how people react to, 
consume and understand it as well as how the material is treated in 
journalistically produced media. Responsible parties: Ministry of the 
Interior, researchers.
4. Increasing information about the types of material that young 
people encounter on the internet. The key questions are the type of 
the material and how young people have reacted to it. The material 
to be collected covers the far right and far left as well as religiously 
motivated extremism. Investigating whether collecting such data 
can be permanently connected with an existing interview survey or 
a corresponding survey. Responsible parties: Ministry of Education 
and Culture, Ministry of Justice, the Finnish National Agency for 
Education, the Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare. 
5. Increasing cooperation between the authorities and companies, with 
the aim of expanding the knowledge of the authorities, parents 
and companies of the way in which terrorist organisations and 
extremist actors utilise computer games and mobile applications in 
communications and networking. War games also make it possible 
to practise armed action in a virtual world. Gaming platforms can be 
used for recruitment and operative communications. Different types 
of dating applications are also used for this purpose. Developing 
counter-measures to combat the above activities. Responsible 
parties: Ministry of the Interior, National Police Board, Finnish 
Security and Intelligence Service, companies. 
6. Strengthening the ability and possibility of the authorities to 
combat and remove terrorist propaganda and punishable hate 
speech efficiently from the internet by making effective use of the 
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opportunities of the current legislation, strengthening the operations 
of the national VIPU group of the Helsinki Police Department and 
the National Bureau of Investigation as well as police activity taking 
place in social media. Utilising the opportunities offered by Chapter 
17(17) of the Criminal Code of Finland (Distribution of depictions 
of violence38) in removing violent material disseminated over the 
internet. Responsible parties: Ministry of the Interior, National 
Police Board, National Bureau of Investigation, police departments.
7. Taking account of promoting dialogue between cultures and 
preventing hate speech in grants allocated by the Arts Promotion 
Centre Finland to promoting cultural diversity and combatting 
racism. Placing emphasis on the grants to actors who in their 
activities promote dialogue and interaction between different 
cultures as well as the prevention of hate speech.  Responsible 
parties: Ministry of Education and Culture, Arts Promotion Centre 
Finland. 
8. Participating in international cooperation to remove terrorist 
propaganda and punishable hate speech from the internet. 
Taking the necessary steps related to the initiative of the European 
Commission to remove terrorist propaganda from the internet, 
provided that the initiative is approved. Securing the necessary 
resources. Responsible parties: Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of 
Justice, National Police Board, National Bureau of Investigation. 
9. Implementing the sections of the Government Programme of Prime 
Minister Rinne according to which intersectoral measures will 
be implemented to intervene even more strongly in systematic 
harassment, threatening and online shaming that threaten 
freedom of speech, the operations of authorities, investigation 
and communications. Taking into consideration measures against 
hate speech in the preparation of the Government’s action plan 
against racism and discrimination. Responsible parties: Ministry 
of Justice, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Education and 
Culture, together with other authorities and non-governmental 
organisations. 
10. Taking intensified action against hate speech and online bullying. 
Several intensified actions against hate speech and online bullying 
38  Criminal Code of Finland, section 17: A person who offers for sale or for rent, distributes or otherwise offers or 
keeps available or for this purpose manufactures or imports films or other audiovisual programmes or recordings 
or data files containing such films or audiovisual programmes depicting brutal violence shall be sentenced for the 
distribution of depictions of violence to a fine or to imprisonment for at most two years.
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are presented in the Ministry of the Interior publication 2019:23, 
prepared by a broad expert group in spring 2019. The responsible 
ministries decide together the actions that will be implemented. 
Responsible parties: Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Justice, 
Ministry of Education and Culture. 
7.2.5 Promoting the safety and security of religious communities and 
their participation in efforts to prevent violent radicalisation and 
extremism
Violent extremism affects religious communities in many ways. Religious communities 
are the target of the threat imposed by violent extremist groups. Religious communities 
and their members are subject to violence, threatening with violence and hate speech. 
According to research, Muslim women identified according to their clothing are more 
often subject to violence and threats in public places than men, and violence against them 
has increased. 
Security threats are imposed on the premises of religious communities and the people 
gathering there, and preparing for such threats calls for more resources and competence. 
This type of threat has increased and become more serious in recent times, as indicated 
by the attacks committed against mosques and Muslim places of prayer. Threats against 
Jewish communities have continued to increase with the rise of anti-Semitism. The threat 
against religious communities has also increased in Finland and they have been subjected 
to more vandalism recently. 
Religious communities suffer from the activities of violent extremist groups in many ways, 
and it is important that they have the opportunity to actively contribute to improving 
the security of their own communities and the society as a whole. Violent radicalisation 
takes place locally, and religious communities are part of local communities, reaching a 
large number of people. They can participate in the prevention of violent radicalisation 
and extremism in many ways. They have the competence and skills that are important for 
prevention, such as knowledge of languages and cultures, family services, the possibility 
to provide psycho-social support and religious literacy. Religious communities can help 
find solutions to local conflicts that, when aggravated, could increase confrontation 
between population groups as well as violent radicalisation. 
Islamophobia has increased in Europe, including Finland, in addition to anti-Semitism. 
Islamophobia means hostility, prejudice and discrimination towards Muslims. It is often 
used as a means for spreading anti-Semitism. 
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Religious communities encounter people in different situations and stages in life and can 
provide doctrinal guidance and mental support and thus strengthen people’s resilience 
against violent extremism and instigation to hate. Religious communities, together 
with authorities and non-governmental organisations, can refer individuals in danger of 
radicalisation to services that help them reject extremist ideology and violence.
Objectives
Increasing the crisis preparedness of religious communities, the security of their places 
of worship as well as the safety and sense of security of their members by enhancing the 
investigation of hate crimes, including hate speech that fulfills the criteria of a crime. 
Strengthening the ability and opportunities of religious communities to participate 
in the prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism by increasing cooperation 
and competence in the prevention of violent extremism and in efforts to prevent the 
impacts of polarisation and hate speech. Increasing confidence and cooperation between 
the authorities, religious communities, especially their female members, and non-
governmental organisations. The aim is to ensure that information on the prevention of 
violent extremism, the existing services and opportunities to receive support reaches the 
individuals and families who are in a vulnerable position or need support. 
Increasing the religion literacy skills of authorities working with religious communities and 
their knowledge of the role of the communities as a local partner and bridge builder. 
Measures
1. Investigating threats imposed on the premises of religious 
communities and organising training to improve their preparedness 
for security threats and crises. Preparing a premises safety manual 
for use by religious communities. Utilising international examples in 
the training. Responsible parties: Ministry of the Interior, National 
Police Board, police departments. 
2. Investigating how procedures for funding security measures for 
religious communities (excluding the Evangelic-Lutheran Church in 
Finland39) should be reformed in view of the elevated threat level. 
Responsible parties: Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Education 
and Culture
39  The church has a taxation right through which it collects funds for its operations, including security measures.
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3. Increasing the knowledge of religious communities about what 
happens after hate crime is reported and how the matter proceeds 
from the police to the prosecutor and court40. Responsible parties: 
National Police Board, police departments. 
4. Organising supplementary training for imams and responsible 
persons in religious communities. The aim is to strengthen the 
knowledge of imams and community leaders in Finnish society and 
other social issues so they can support community members with 
correct, up-to-date information. The training includes information on 
fundamental rights, such as equality and gender equality as well as 
citizens’ responsibility. Responsible parties: Finnish National Agency 
for Education, Islamic communities. 
5. Increasing interaction and dialogue between religious communities. 
Creating national and local procedures according to which religious 
communities are regularly summoned to discuss topical issues, 
including safety and security questions. They are alternately 
summoned by different communities, and experts, such as 
authorities’ representatives, can be invited to the occasions, 
where necessary. Where possible, making use in the operations 
of cooperation structures already available. Responsible parties: 
religious communities locally and nationally. 
6. Increasing interaction and dialogue between the authorities and 
religious communities by regularly arranging round table discussions 
about topical and important issues. Responsible parties: national 
and local authorities and religious communities.
7. Increasing the participation of religious communities in local 
cooperation by implementing the recommendations presented 
in the Ministry of the Interior report ”Observations about the case 
management interface and recommendations for the development 
of operation” (2019:17). Responsible parties: Ministry of the Interior, 
non-governmental organisations and authorities participating in 
local cooperation. 
8. Strengthening the competence of religious communities by 
arranging training on the prevention of violent extremism and 
efforts to combat the impacts of polarisation and hate speech. 
Implementing a training package based on the principles and 
tools of peace work for religious communities, including training 
40  Example of how information can be disseminated: Poliisitube YouTube channel, Video on the criminal process 
and the stages of criminal investigation: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_yt_44PdxXY.
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on how to act as a peacemaker in local conflicts. Planning the 
training package in close cooperation with religious communities 
by offering a low-threshold, safe space for discussion, peer learning 
and cooperation. Responsible parties: Finn Church Aid and the 
Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers.
9. Increasing confidence and strengthening cooperation by continuing 
the concrete deployment of the operating models developed in the 
Reach Out operation41 throughout the country. Responsible parties: 
Finn Church Aid and the Network for Religious and Traditional 
Peacemakers together with the National Cooperation Network and 
local cooperation networks.
10. Arranging training on religious literacy skills for authorities working 
with religious communities and strengthening their knowledge 
and awareness of the role of the communities as a local partner 
and bridge builder. Responsible parties: Finn Church Aid and the 
Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers.
11. Increasing research-based knowledge of the types of concerns and 
needs that Muslim communities have about violent radicalisation and 
security. Responsible parties: Ministry of the Interior, researchers. 
7.2.6 Taking into consideration the gender viewpoint in the prevention of 
violent radicalisation and extremism
Violent extremist groups have always had both male and female members. There has 
been more research in recent times into the roles of women in the groups and how violent 
radicalisation and extremism affects women and girls. 
Women and girls are both the victims of violent extremist groups as well as active 
participants in them. They are subjected to sexual and other violence in areas where 
violent extremist groups operate. Globally, women are still more responsible than men 
for raising children and faced with the difficult task of raising and protecting children 
in areas where violent extremist groups operate and actively recruit young people into 
violent activities. In this sense, women can influence the next generation and how violent 
extremist ideas are passed on from one generation to another. Having a family can protect 
women against recruitment as women with a family cannot as easily as the men become 
fully devoted to the activities of violent organisations and promote their goals.
41  Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalisation 2016, Measure 3.
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Throughout history, women have been active actors in violent extremist groups. Their role 
in terrorist organisations and other violent groups depends on the organisation’s ideology, 
culture and the environment in which it operates. Women have more typically participated 
in armed combat in far-left movements than in radical-Islamist Sunni organisations, which 
emphasise the traditional role of women, or in far-right movements and organisations. 
The motives and reasons why women join violent extremist movements or organisations 
are different from those of men. Women often became radicalised by their friends and 
relatives, and collectively by a group of friends, for example. 
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible for the compilation and implementation 
of the UN Women, Peace and Security Action Plan (Resolution 1325) together with other 
actors. The Action Plan contains objectives and measures that strengthen women’s 
participation in the prevention of violent radicalisation. 
Objectives
Increasing knowledge and awareness of the ways in which violent radicalisation and 
extremism affects girls and women in Finland and what can be done to support them 
in situations where they are subjected to the actions of violent extremist groups or to 
their influence. Increasing information to support prevention concerning the factors 
and motives leading to the radicalisation of girls and women and their joining violent 
extremist groups. Strengthening the participation of girls and women in the prevention of 
violent radicalisation. 
Measures
1. Conducting research into the involvement of girls and women 
in violent extreme movements in Finland. The research provides 
information on the types of roles and tasks held by girls and women 
in the movements, the reasons why they join and support them, 
how recruitment takes place and the types of differences between 
extremist groups with respect to girls and women. Responsible 
parties: Ministry of the Interior, researchers.
2. Promoting the participation of young women in the planning and 
implementation of measures preventing violent radicalisation. 
Ensuring that the participants come from many different 
backgrounds. Responsible parties: National Cooperation Network, 
local cooperation and multi-professional groups. 
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7.2.7 Preventing radicalisation in prisons and reducing threats connected 
with released prisoners
Combatting violent radicalisation in prisons is a key objective in all EU Member States. 
Many individuals who committed a terrorist attack in Europe became radicalised while 
in prison. According to information collected by the European Commission on the EU 
Members States, almost 500 prisoners sentenced for terrorist crimes or having become 
radicalised in prison, were released in 2018 or will be released in 2019. In the future, their 
number will increase because the number of prisoners becoming radicalised in prison is 
estimated to grow. This is due to returnees from the conflict areas in Syria and Iraq as well 
as an increase in homegrown terrorism and radicalisation. 
The Criminal Sanctions Agency carried out a project on the identification of violent 
extremism and radicalisation in 2016–2018. During the project, observations were 
made of more than 100 individuals, of which about 50 were serving a prison sentence. 
The operation was established as part of the Criminal Sanction Agency’s agenda and its 
resources were increased in 2018–2019. In March 2019, a total of seven Criminal Sanction 
Agency’s officials were working full-time to identify and prevent violent radicalisation. 
The primary purpose of Health Care Services for Prisoners is to produce high-quality, 
correctly timed health care services for all prisoners in all prisons in Finland. Health Care 
Services for Prisoners meets every prisoner upon their entering prison and conducts an 
exhaustive health examination. Its role is to identify individuals of concern encountered 
in connection with their normal health care duties and to refer them to the appropriate 
services during imprisonment. The Act on the Health Care Services for Prisoners sets out 
the possibility to inform the Criminal Sanctions Agency of situations that could endanger 
the health or safety of the prisoner, their inmates or prison personnel, notwithstanding 
provisions relating to secrecy.
Objectives
The aim is to identify radicalised prisoners, individuals radicalising other prisoners, 
prisoners in danger of radicalisation as well as customers serving a community sanction. 
Preventing the activities of individuals radicalising others. Targeting measures at 
individuals in danger of radicalisation in order to prevent their radicalisation. Targeting 
rehabilitative measures at all individuals showing signs of radicalisation. Measures can 
be imposed on persons released from prison and subject to probationary supervision 
that reduce the threat of terrorism they may pose. From the point of view of Health Care 
Services of Prisoners, early identification and proper referral to services are key goals. 
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Measures
1. Ensuring a shared overview, flow of information and cooperation. 
The management of the Criminal Sanctions Agency, the National 
Bureau of Investigation, the Finnish Security and Intelligence 
Service and Health Care Services for Prisoners meet regularly 
once a year, summoned by the Criminal Sanctions Agency. The 
theme of the meeting is the situation in prisons with respect to 
violent radicalisation and the threat of terrorism, cooperation 
with released prisoners as well as making the necessary decisions 
about development measures. Regionally, representatives from the 
Criminal Sanctions Agency, the National Bureau of Investigation, 
local police, the Finnish Security and Intelligence Service and Health 
Care Services for Prisoners meet regularly to discuss development 
needs and topical issues. Responsible parties: Criminal Sanctions 
Agency, National Police Board, National Bureau of Investigation, 
Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, Health Care Services for 
Prisoners. 
2. Training and expertise. Preventing violent radicalisation in prisons 
and interacting with released prisoners requires that sufficient, 
regular training is arranged for the personnel. Responsible party: 
Criminal Sanctions Agency.
3. Identifying radicalisation. Target persons and groups are subject to 
surveillance in order to identify radicalisation. The target persons 
can be ordinary prisoners, those serving life, remand or fine 
sentence as well as community sanction customers. Responsible 
party: Criminal Sanctions Agency.
4. Reporting observations. Officials of the Criminal Sanctions Agency 
report the concerns they have observed to officials, who are 
responsible for processing the information for the identification 
of radicalisation. Observations can be related to the behaviour of 
individuals, the atmosphere in the cell block or the property in the 
individual’s possession. Responsible party: Criminal Sanctions 
Agency.  
5. Early prevention. To prevent radicalisation, interactive work is done 
with customers in which individuals representing different cultures 
and religious backgrounds are met with dignity and in a culturally 
sensitive manner. Responsible party: Criminal Sanctions Agency.
6. Dynamic security and continuous interaction with customers. These 
play an important role in identifying and preventing radicalisation. 
Active interactive work is done with customers and convicted 
prisoners, with the aim of helping the authorities identify possible 
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changes in the individual’s behaviour and support them in rejecting 
extremist ideology. Responsible party: Criminal Sanctions Agency.
7. Dealing with radicalised and radicalising individuals. If a person 
is considered to have become radicalised or to be in danger of 
radicalisation, their situation is assessed and they are subjected 
to customised measures to interrupt the development of 
radicalisation. The assessment is updated, where necessary. 
Responsible party: Criminal Sanctions Agency.
8. Friday prayers. According to Chapter 11, section 3 of the 
Imprisonment Act (767/2005), where possible, church services, 
devotional services and other religious events shall be arranged 
in a prison in accordance with the prisoners’ needs. Prisoners 
shall be given the possibility to meet a pastoral counsellor or 
another representative of their own religion. Prisons shall have 
premises suitable for the practice of religion. As a rule, practicing 
Christianity in prisons is ensured, and some prisons have prison 
priests who belong to the Criminal Sanctions Agency’s personnel. 
The opportunities for Muslim prisoners to practise their religion 
are not always adequate. The challenge is to ensure that the 
imams visiting prisons are mainstream Muslims and do not spread 
an interpretation urging violence. Developing procedures to 
enhance the right of Muslim prisoners to practise their religion and 
ensuring that the imams visiting prisons are mainstream Muslims. 
Responsible parties: Ministry of Justice, Criminal Sanctions Agency, 
representatives of Muslim communities. 
9. Preparing a manual or handbook to promote equality in the 
implementation of imprisonment, especially with a view to Muslim 
prisoners. Responsible parties: representatives of Muslim 
communities and authorities together. 
10. Offering alternatives. Means for self-development are offered to 
individuals in danger of radicalisation, with the aim of distancing 
them from factors sustaining radicalisation. Responsible party: 
Criminal Sanctions Agency. 
11. Measures taken by Health Care Services for Prisoners. Identifying 
signs of radicalisation observed in connection with normal work and 
being able to refer individuals to appropriate services. Responsible 
parties: Health Care Services for Prisoners, Criminal Sanctions 
Agency.
12. Actions taken before release from prison. The release of a prisoner 
is planned in accordance with the statutory release plan. Among 
other things, the plan covers housing, education, job and family 
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situation.  For municipalities, it is important to receive information 
on radicalised released prisoners so they can plan the necessary 
support measures. In some cases, released prisoners return to 
reception centres and detention units. Support measures play a 
decisive role in the case of radicalised prisoners, as without them 
they may end up dealing with the same people they used be in 
contact with before imprisonment. The individual may have become 
radicalised by these people or may have acted as a radicaliser 
themselves. Responsible parties: Criminal Sanctions Agency, 
municipalities in which released prisoners settle down, reception 
centres. 
13. Dealing with released prisoners. The Criminal Sanctions Agency 
provides the National Bureau of Investigation, the Finnish 
Security and Intelligence Service and the police department of 
the prisoner’s home municipality with information on the target 
persons who will be released from prison. Necessary cooperation 
between the authorities (local police, the Finnish Security and 
Intelligence Service, municipal social services, etc.) is arranged 
at every police department so that the situation with the target 
person to be released can be exhaustively assessed and monitored. 
Responsible parties: Criminal Sanctions Agency, National Bureau 
of Investigation, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service, police 
departments, municipalities. 
14. Developing legislation. The Finnish Immigration Service makes 
decisions about residence permits and granting citizenship. It is 
important that when making decisions, the Finnish Immigration 
Service has access to and can use all the information of relevance 
to decision-making. Currently, the data in the security information 
register can only be disclosed to the police, Defence Command, 
Finnish Customs and the Finnish Border Guard. Therefore, the 
criminal sanctions authorities cannot independently disclose data 
in the security information register to the Finnish Immigration 
Service. Legislation should be revised in this respect and allow the 
disclosure of such data to the Finnish Immigration Service. This also 
requires training the personnel of the Finnish Immigration Service 
in the processing of confidential information. Responsible parties: 
Ministry of the Interior, the Finnish Immigration Service, Ministry 
of Justice. 
15. Ensuring that municipalities have sufficient information on 
organising services for persons who are released from prison and 
involve the risk of violent radicalisation. According to the Ministry 
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of Social Affairs and Health, section 35 of the Social Welfare Act 
can be applied in cases where a person of age returns to the 
municipality from the conflict areas in Syria and Iraq. Investigating 
whether municipal authorities can be informed under section 35 
of the Social Welfare Act of persons to be released from prison and 
involving the risk of violent radicalisation so that this can be taken 
into consideration in assessing their service needs. Responsible 
parties: Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, Criminal Sanctions 
Agency, Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities. 
7.2.8 Developing training and competence 
The aim is that the prevention of violent radicalisation is based on research-based 
knowledge and competence. Obtaining up-to-date information and maintaining 
competence is challenging as the operations connect with the work of several authorities 
and non-governmental organisations. The basic and supplementary education for 
different professionals only include a few themes that would directly offer capabilities 
to prevent violent radicalisation. On the other hand, it is important to note that good 
education and professional skill as such also provide a good basis for this work. However, 
the matter is often considered difficult and hard to tackle unless there is sufficient 
confidence in having the necessary knowledge and competence about the subject. 
Different authorities have organised training in the prevention of violent radicalisation. 
A good example of training arranged by the police, which is based on good practices 
developed in the EU. A broad training programme42 has been implemented in the 
education sector, and on-line training is being planned in social and health services about 
the theme. In addition, seminars and training events have been arranged nationally and 
by local cooperation networks. Finnish experts have participated in international training, 
most notably the seminars and training arranged by the EU’s Radicalisation Awareness 
Network since 2011. The operation is carried out through sub-groups43 of which there are 
currently 10. The working groups also arrange common events. 
Developing training as an important development target was taken up in the assessment 
of the 2016 National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and 
42  Further information on the training programme can be obtained from the Expert network on extremist ideas 
and resilience of the Faculty of Educational Sciences, the University of Helsinki.
43  The groups are as follows: RAN Communication and Narratives, RAN Education, RAN Exit, RAN Health and Social 
Care, RAN local (local operation), RAN Prisons and Probation, RAN Police, RAN Remembrance of Victims of Terrorism, 
RAN Youth, Families and Communities, RAN Young.
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Extremism44 . It was stated in the assessment that no clear goals or priorities have been set 
for the training of actors in the field. The resources available for the training of actors do 
not meet the needs of the provider of the training or the participants. In addition, training 
material is poorly available, especially for self-study purposes. It is recommended that the 
training of actors in the field should have clearer goals and priorities so that the limited 
resources can be targeted correctly. In addition, the planned web-based training and self-
study packages could help in the situation. 
Objectives
Arranging regular training on the prevention of violent radicalisation for the authorities 
and other actors engaged in the work. Setting goals and priorities for training and 
implementing it nationally and for different sectors. Another aim is that matters related to 
the prevention of violent radicalisation can also be effectively taken up in connection with 
other training. 
Measures
1. Confirming the goals and priorities of the training in connection 
with preparing the annual National Action Plan. The goals and 
priorities cover both national and sectoral training, including locally 
arranged training. Responsible parties: National Cooperation 
Network and its members for their own sectors.
2. Preparing an annual plan for national training and applying for 
centralised funding for its implementation. Responsible party: 
Ministry of the Interior. 
3. Making sure that the various sectors annually arrange targeted, 
systematic training in the prevention of violent radicalisation and 
provide financial support for it. The training targets set are taken 
into consideration in the training. Responsible parties: Authorities 
participating in the implementation of the National Action Plan 
for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism. 
4. Participating in RAN training. Different sectors ensure, through 
the RAN contact point (Ministry of the Interior), that their 
representatives participate in training arranged by RAN. Providing 
information on the topics and other materials taken up in the 
training efficiently and systematically for use by other actors within 
44  Assessment of the National Action Plan for the Prevention of Violent Radicalisation and Extremism of the 
Ministry of the Interior. Ministry of the Interior publications 2019:18. 
66
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2020:3
the organisation. Responsible parties: Ministry of the Interior, 
different actors and non-governmental organisations. 
7.3 Objectives and measures of the authorities participating 
in the implementation to prevent violent radicalisation 
and extremism
This chapter describes the objectives and measures of the implementing authorities to 
prevent violent radicalisation and extremism and to develop the work. The measures and 
objectives were prepared by the authorities themselves. 
7.3.1 Prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism in social and 
health services
Objectives
Social and health services prevent violent radicalisation by promoting the health and 
wellbeing of their customers. Becoming subject to the influence of violent ideologies is 
combatted by strengthening psychological resistance or resilience.  Violently radicalised 
individuals are encountered as part of customer work in social welfare services and in the 
various fields of health care. The most important development target in the sector is to 
identify individuals who have become or are in danger of becoming violently radicalised. 
Violent radicalisation and extremism are topics that call for special expertise and multi-
professional skills in order to arrange and develop care and services. 
Social and health care professionals help persons of concern individually and in a timely 
fashion with the help of their work community and the methods developed in the 
sector, together with other professionals or referring individuals to other services. It is 
also part of the professionals work to enhance the individual’s sense of participation in 
order to strengthen their operating capacity over the sense of social exclusion. The safety 
and security of the person, their friends and relatives as well as society in general are 
strengthened at the same time. In social welfare services, the focus in preventive efforts 
is on adult social work, immigration services and especially basic and special services for 
families with children (including child welfare services and services for young people). In 
health care, emphasis is placed on pupil and student health care, including emergency 
care, psychosocial support and mental health services in acute cases. Any specific mental 
disorder or psychological profile is not known to be connected with violent radicalisation. 
However, becoming subject to the influence of violent ideologies or activities can 
67
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR 2020:3 NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT RADICALISATION AND EXTREMISM 2019–2023
aggravate mental disorders. Mental disorders are slightly more common among single 
radicalised individuals than among the rest of the population. It may be possible to 
reduce the risk of radicalisation in care as it promotes the social skills of the patients, 
increases their networks, improves their ability to lead a meaningful daily life and reduces 
frustration.
Measures 
1. Dealing with a person who has become or is in danger of becoming 
radicalised. When encountering a person who has been or is facing 
the threat of being radicalised, social and health care professionals 
first investigate whether the case has signs of committing violent 
acts or urging others to commit them. If a threat of violence or 
instigation to it is observed, the social and health care professional 
first finds out whether the person or their friends and relatives can 
be assisted through means available to the professional or the 
work community or whether the person should be referred to the 
services of other authorities. Furthermore, it must be investigated 
which party should be informed of such signs and how. Social and 
health care professionals have the right to report to the police any 
information necessary for assessing a threat or act posed to people’s 
life or health without prejudice to the confidentiality obligation. 
There are separate instructions for multi-professional Anchor teams 
operating in police departments. Responsible parties: social and 
health care professionals. 
2. Strengthening participation. Multi-professional, multi-sectoral 
work plays a key role in preventive work. Social and health care 
actors participate in Anchor work. Ohjaamo guidance centres 
and workforce services support integration with the rest of 
society. Proper treatment of mental disorders in part supports the 
prevention of violent extremist ideas. It should be noted, however, 
that extremism is not a mental disorder and a mental disorder does 
not involve extremist violent ideas. Responsible parties: social and 
health care professionals. 
3. Preventing the violent radicalisation of children and young people. 
The child’s own environments, such as early childhood education 
and school, are important actors in prevention. Early childhood 
education is supported by maternity and child health clinics and 
family centres in the health care system. Student welfare and school 
health care services are available at schools, and student health 
care and student welfare services in tertiary education. If a child or 
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young person is suspected of having a mental disorder, they can be 
referred to more detailed examinations in specialised medical care. 
Approximately 20–25 per cent of young people suffer from mental 
disorders. Proper care of the mental disorder is of use when seeking 
to improve the individual’s possibility to act as a member of their 
community and society. Responsible parties: social and health care 
professionals. 
4. The radicalisation of children and young people is a new 
phenomenon in Finland, and there is not even international 
research-based proof of the use of different methods in their care. 
The principle in their care is the same as that for adults. The social 
support received by children, young people and their families 
affects the environment in which children are brought up. Where 
necessary, social welfare or non-institutional child welfare measures 
are targeted at the family. If needed, a child or young person can 
also be placed in a suitable growth environment where they can 
abandon violent ideologies and activities, supported with other 
specific support, where necessary. Responsible parties: social and 
health care professionals. 
5. Utilising the services of regional centres of expertise and support. 
Services requiring highly demanding special expertise have been 
regionally focused in five centres of expertise and support (OT 
centres), from which the necessary services can be provided equally 
throughout the region. Support and care for helping children 
and young people reject a violent radicalisation process is very 
challenging and requires special expertise. Although most of the 
social and health care professionals do not encounter these children 
and young people in their work, it is important for them to know 
what to do if they do encounter them. Responsible parties: social 
and health care professionals. 
6. Increasing research-based knowledge. Scientific research plays 
an important role in developing the operations, legislation in the 
field as well as the exchange of information. The Finnish Institute 
for Health and Welfare supports the identification of violently 
radicalised individuals as well as the development of suitable 
means of care and support through research and education. In 
addition, multi-professional cooperation is developed with the 
police, education sector and immigration authorities, for example. 
The research and investigations basically serve practical work, 
looks at the phenomenon and its impacts as well as assesses the 
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implementation of the chosen strategy. Responsible party: Finnish 
Institute for Health and Welfare.
7. Preparing and providing online training and other supplementary 
training. The Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare plans and 
prepares an online training package to support social and health 
care professionals and their partners, consisting of videos, inserts, 
background material, group work materials as well as questions for 
assessing learning. The training package also includes instructions 
and support material for arranging workshops and contact teaching 
days. The planned training is free of charge and can be used freely. 
Its use is assessed and it is updated regularly. Responsible party: 
Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare.
8. Participating in international cooperation. In the healthcare and 
social welfare sector, European-wide cooperation takes place 
through bilateral contacts and the sector’s own Radical Awareness 
Network (RAN). There is also a Nordic RAN network in the healthcare 
and social welfare sector. Some of the research and development 
work on the theme is conducted with international partners. 
Responsible parties: social and health care professionals. 
7.3.2 Prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism in the reception 
system
Reception centre customers may face the risk of violent radicalisation. They often come 
from areas with violence, including violence and hate between different population 
groups, as well as confrontation. Due to possible wars and long-lasting unrest, some 
of these customers may have no experience of living side by side in peace. Moving to 
another country does not always take away these experiences. They may be sustained 
by messages from relatives and friends in the former home country and news received 
from there. The above factors, possible disappointments experienced in Finland as well as 
uncertainty about the future can make some reception centre customers vulnerable to the 
propaganda of and recruitment by violent extremist groups. 
Objectives
The basic work done in the reception system is high quality and based on the common 
operating models shared by the Finnish Immigration Service and all reception centres, as 
well as on the regular guidance and training of the reception centre personnel. 
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The quality of the centres is consistent and their aim is to treat all customers equally.  
Customers with special needs are assisted and supported according to the possibilities 
available. 
The observations made by the personnel about violent radicalisation, healthcare and 
social welfare services, guidance as well as an approach that takes account of security 
issues all help prevent violent radicalisation at an early stage. Close local cooperation 
between different authorities and actors promotes the earliest intervention in violent 
radicalisation possible, supports the work done in the centres and allows referring 
individuals also to services provided by outside service providers.
Measures
1. Training reception centre personnel to identify violent radicalisation. 
Regularly training the reception centre personnel on the 
phenomenon and about the actions they should take in case of 
persons of concern. Making use of the expertise and knowledge 
of different experts in the training. Responsible parties: Finnish 
Immigration Service, reception centres. 
2. Training asylum seekers who have arrived in the country. Each 
asylum centre resident aged over 16 years completes a basic 
course on Finnish society. The course provides the necessary 
basic information on living in a reception centre and the rights 
and obligations available while living there. It gives the customer 
initial information and also introduces them more broadly to 
Finnish society, its operating culture as well as how to act outside 
of the reception centre. The course promotes the asylum seekers’ 
awareness of being part of and participating in Finnish society. 
Responsible parties: Finnish Immigration Service, reception 
centres.
3. Strengthening work in reception centres. Emphasising the 
importance of the early support provided by the reception 
centre personnel. Customers’ needs are not necessarily limited to 
specific issues that should only be dealt with by a specific group of 
professionals. Multi-professional cooperation between employees, 
active observations and a proactive approach are central to the 
operations.  Targeting special support measures as early as possible 
to persons of concern. Referring individuals to existing services 
provided by other authorities as well as private and public sector 
actors. Responsible party: Finnish Immigration Service, reception 
centres. 
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4. Increasing cooperation with local authorities and other actors. 
Encouraging and helping reception centres pursue local 
cooperation and create, together with the local authorities 
and other actors, cooperation models supporting and helping 
the reception centre customers. Responsible party: Finnish 
Immigration Service, reception centres. 
5. Reporting observations. The reception centre personnel inform the 
local authorities of any activities causing concern in accordance with 
the agreed procedures and the confidentiality provisions in force. 
Accordingly, urgent cases are immediately reported to the number 
112 and other cases to the local police. The local police forward the 
information to the appropriate authorities.  The observations may 
concern violence, recruitment, violence based on extremist ideas, 
glorifying terrorism or other security threats. Responsible parties: 
Finnish Immigration Service, reception centres, local police. 
7.3.3 Actions of the police to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism 
The police are a key actor in preventing and combatting violent radicalisation and 
extremism. Their statutory duty is to maintain public order and safety and security as well 
as combat crime. Maintaining public order and safety and security includes maintaining 
a safe, pleasant living and operating environment as well as combatting and preventing 
disturbances and any violation of rights. These duties are closely connected with the 
prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism. The ability and skill of the police to 
prevent violent radicalisation has improved in the last few years. The unit for preventive 
action of the National Bureau of Investigation (Threats, TUPA and Internet intelligence 
functions) together with the preventive actions taken by the police departments make up 
a distinct entity for dealing with all individuals of concern.
The national strategy for preventive police work was confirmed in December 2018. It 
includes a confirmed strategic guideline according to which the police prevent violent 
radicalisation, extremism, the activities of extremist movements as well as hate crime. The 
goals and strategic guidelines of the strategy also promote measures that reduce the root 
causes and factors underlying violent radicalisation and extremism, such as increased 
confrontation between population groups, polarisation and origination of groups outside 
of society. 
Objectives
In their work, the police identify individuals who are at risk of being violently radicalised 
or who have already been radicalised and deal with them in the manner required by 
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the threat assessment. The police investigate tips and, where allowed by the legislation, 
give feedback to the whistleblower with the aim of strengthening the whistleblower’s 
confidence about the proper handling of tips and about their leading to the necessary 
actions. Criminal intelligence plays an important role in the ability of the police to 
detect violent radicalisation. Police information systems are used effectively and 
comprehensively, based on legislation, for storing information, preparing analyses and 
forming a national overview. Visible actions by the police on the internet and other 
intelligence activities taking place there increase the possibilities for detecting violent 
radicalisation and intervening in it as early as possible.
The police effectively refer individuals facing the risk of radicalisation to services by 
implementing the operating method outlined in the Ministry of the Interior publication 
2019:17 (Appendix 1). The police support other authorities and representatives of non-
governmental organisations in actions related to the prevention of violent radicalisation 
and extremism by providing expert assistance and advice. 
The police participate in the work of local cooperation groups for the prevention of violent 
radicalisation and extremism and produce information, together with other authorities, for 
preparing a local threat assessment. The police target actions decided on in the national 
strategy for preventive work, especially in areas where violent extremist groups and 
related individuals have a negative impact on safety and security and sense of security of 
people and communities. Multi-professional Anchor teams operating in connection with 
police departments prevent violent radicalisation and implement actions through which a 
person who is at risk of violent radicalisation or who has already been radicalised is helped 
to reject violent activities and referred to other services, where necessary.  
Measures
1. Ensuring that the guidelines issued by the National Police Board to 
police units on the processing of tips concerning violence are known 
to all actors who need them in their work. The guidelines provide 
national, consistent procedures for processing and forwarding 
information and for determining the division of responsibilities 
between actors. Efficient use of the guidelines clarifies the operating 
processes crucial in view of the prevention of violent radicalisation. 
Responsible parties: National Police Board, police departments, 
National Bureau of Investigation. 
2. Developing the internal and external dissemination of information 
on violent radicalisation with the aim of ensuring it is up to date 
and making it available to every actor who needs it in their work. 
Ensuring that the police unit personnel are familiar with the 
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procedures and know how to apply them. Responsible parties: 
Police departments, National Police Board, National Bureau of 
Investigation. 
3. Harmonising and clarifying the practices of police departments in 
preparing statistics on extremist crime. The aim is that the practices 
are consistent with respect to whether acts committed during 
demonstrations are recorded as a single offence or several offences, 
for example. Instructions of the National Police Board for criminal 
matters to be reported to the prosecutor, the notification procedure 
and the prosecutor’s actions (POL-2018-50728) are applicable 
to extremist crime with a political motive or a motive set out in 
Chapter 6, section 5(4) of the Criminal Code of Finland. Notification 
ensures the prosecutor’s ability to take the needs of the criminal 
process into consideration in the fulfilment of criminal liability. 
Responsible parties: National Police Board, police departments.  
4. Taking an extremist motive into consideration in pre-trial 
investigation with the aim of promptly completing the investigation 
of such a crime. Responsible party: Police departments. 
5. Developing and harmonising processes used to assess threats related 
to people and phenomena. Responsible parties: National Police 
Board, police departments, National Bureau of Investigation. 
6. The police participate in the work of regional and local cooperation 
networks preventing violent radicalisation and extremism 
and, where necessary, adopt a coordination and management 
responsibility for their work. Cooperation with different actors 
allows the creation of an overview and intervention at an early 
stage in phenomena that signal violent radicalisation. Cooperation 
is concrete, and case-specific processes are launched with the key 
actor in order to ensure effective prevention.  Responsible parties: 
Police departments. 
7. Training the police in preventing polarisation and in dealing with 
polarised situations. Responsible party: National Police Board. 
8. The investigation of hate crime, including punishable hate speech, is 
enhanced and measures are taken to continue training the police in 
the identification and investigation of hate crime. Only a few victims 
of hate crime are referred to support services. The police promote 
referral to the services according to section 18 of the Criminal 
Investigation Act. Responsible parties: National Police Board, 
police departments. 
9. The police implement Exit activities throughout the country with the 
aim of helping individuals break free from the influence of violent 
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extremist movements and organised crime. Responsible parties: 
National Bureau of Investigation, police departments. 
7.3.4 Prevention of violent radicalisation and extremism in the education 
sector
The education sector is a key actor supporting the wellbeing, development and learning 
of children and young people. Teaching and education comprehensively reach children 
and young people at the compulsory education age, and also widely individuals who 
participate in early childhood education, upper secondary and vocational education, as 
well as in basic education for adults. As the phenomena in society are also reflected in 
educational institutions and early childhood education, the education sector plays an 
important role in combatting social polarisation, racism and hate speech. Many of the 
viewpoints presented in this chapter can also be applied to higher education. 
Objectives
The content, methods, and goals related to broad-based prevention are based on the 
national core curricula and are already an essential part of the daily operations of the 
education sector. However, according to research, there is still a considerable need to 
increase educators’ knowledge about extremist ideologies and violent extremism as well 
as develop constructive prevention measures.
Phenomena related to violent radicalisation and extremism become visible and tangible 
in educational institutions in many ways, such as through the media, news and the 
experience and/or comments of learners or their families. Learners need knowledge and 
skills to process topical issues in order to understand and reflect the social phenomena 
around them. It is important to address issues featured in the media with children and 
young people to ensure that their understanding of such situations is based on facts and 
not imagination or biased interpretations. 
The role of the education sector with regard to the prevention of violent extremism is 
multi-dimensional, as educational institutions play an important role in preventing the 
proliferation of violent extremist ideas at the broad, societal level. However, educators 
must also know how to address themes and events related to violent extremism with 
learners as they come up in everyday life. In addition, educational institutions are also 
in a position to identify the specific needs that students may have and guide the person 
of concern to the right service, as well as to act as a partner in the multi-professional 
cooperation network. These key dimensions are illustrated in the REDI-model below, 
which provides a framework for addressing, preventing and countering violent extremism 
in the education sector.
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Dimensions 0 and 1 a-b refer to the general curriculum-based objectives of day-to-day 
educational practices that concern all educators, and more specifically to those skills 
and knowledge that are thought to support the prevention of violent radicalisation and 
extremism, as well as other negative and harmful developments. Dimensions 2, 3 and 4 
refer to specific situations where a learner’s possible engagement with violent ideologies 
raises concern, and in which the educator acts as part of a multi-professional cooperation 
network. 
Figure 1. REDI-model for Supporting Resilience, Democracy and Dialogue Against Violent Radicalization and 
Extremism in Educational Institutions (Vallinkoski, Koirikivi & Benjamin 2019)
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Overall prevention framework: dimensions guiding activities  
in the education sector
Dimension 0: educator’s self-reflection
Objective: The educator recognises their own values, worldviews/beliefs, intuitive 
responses and thinking styles, and understands the role these play in ways they interpret 
information and encounter learners.
It is important for all educators to recognise their own preconceptions and knowledge 
of the related phenomena, as these set preconditions for open, positive encounters with 
the learners, as well as for discussing themes related to violent extremism with learners. 
This dimension involves essentially the educator’s awareness of their own knowledge 
base, life experiences, values and worldviews, as these act as a filter and lens for how the 
educator perceives different sets of values and ideologies, takes a stand towards them 
and interprets social phenomena. Therefore, it is important to strengthen educators’ 
knowledge of the phenomena related to violent radicalisation and extremism, as well as of 
the goals that education aims to reach regarding the prevention of extremism at all levels 
of the education system.
With regard to educators’ professional competence, it is important that they recognise 
and critically view their own values and worldviews and become aware of their intuitive 
responses to the themes linked to violent extremism. This, in turn, influences the types 
of thinking and actions they consider acceptable, normal and desirable. In particular, it is 
important for educators to consider the thoughts they have and the practices they adopt 
when encountering different learners, especially those whose backgrounds differ from 
their own. Educators should pay attention to how they address themes that are unfamiliar 
or foreign to them, and to the type of worldview they convey to learners through their 
choice of words, learning materials and content. Reaching the objectives of Dimension 
1a, i.e. addressing themes related to violent extremism in a pedagogically and ethically 
sustainable way, requires educators to critically approach and reflect on the topics 
discussed through the evaluation of one’s own worldview and the broader social context 
in which they operate. 
Dimension 1a: addressing extremism 
Objective: To discuss unsettling events or controversial issues with learners in a 
pedagogically and ethically sustainable way.
The target group for dimensions 1a and 1b is the whole school community. Measures 
can be implemented by the educator alone or in collaboration with other actors within 
the educational institution, such as guardians, non-governmental organisations and the 
student welfare group. 
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It is important for educators to know that there are several background factors and 
mechanisms that can be related to violent radicalisation and extremism, such as the 
individual’s mental wellbeing, perceived grievances, poor social relations or broader 
oppressive social structures. Therefore, radicalisation is not a question of a clearly defined 
phenomenon or process and there is no single factor (e.g. religion, social exclusion, 
mental problems, poverty or bullying) that alone would make a young person vulnerable 
to violent radicalisation. Maintaining this perspective is particularly important when 
discussing themes related to the phenomenon with learners. 
When unsettling events committed by man (such as terrorist attacks) or controversial 
themes (which divide opinions and arouse strong emotions) are discussed with learners, 
it is important for the educator to avoid creating distorted images or strengthening 
stereotypes and threats. Learners must be given time and space to talk about their 
concerns, even though it is important to move forward in the discussion after this initial 
stage. It is important to discuss the topics according to the age of the learners, stick 
to facts (what is actually known about the event), present different viewpoints about 
the phenomenon and pay attention to the structures that strengthen learners’ sense 
of security and control, such as the operations of rescue workers and other officials. 
The educator can support the development of learners’ critical thinking by introducing 
different viewpoints and historical perspectives to the events, as well as by addressing 
questions related to political, geographical, religious or ethnic background factors. It is 
also important to guide the learners’ attention to the different ways of coping with the 
given situation, to the sense of togetherness, solutions and alternative ways to act.  The 
educator should be aware that the way in which the same phenomena are discussed in 
homes, may vary considerably from that of the educational institution. Situations where 
the learner has to make a moral choice between the values or interpretations of the home 
and the school are especially sensitive. Such dilemmas should be addressed sensitively 
and by increasing learners’ understanding of the different perspectives in play, while 
stressing that use of violence is always condemned. 
The educator can also expand their resources to address different topics by studying 
different worldviews, as well as the ideologies underlying extremist groups. Increased 
understanding of violent extremism as a phenomenon can be obtained by becoming 
familiar with the processes, mechanisms and factors that may underlie extremism. 
Outlining these can help the educator not only discuss violent extremism and terrorism 
with learners (Dimension 1a), but also deal with situations where topics related to 
extremism suddenly emerge in everyday school life (Dimension 2).
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Dimension 1b: broad-based prevention of violent extremism (PVE)
Objective: To develop the operational culture and organisational practices of educational 
institutions in a manner that strengthens the resilience of learners and the entire school 
community.
A key issue in Dimension 1b, (broad-based prevention) is to create an operational culture 
and practices that support all children and young people in their participation, wellbeing 
and positive integration with society. According to research, positive relationships, a 
sense of belonging and self-regulation skills strengthen the individual’s resilience, i.e. 
psychological endurance and their ability to maintain agency in difficult or stressful 
situations. Resilience has been found to balance out and mitigate the negative impacts 
of the risk factors in young people’s lives and thus prevent not only violent extremism 
but also many other harmful developments. In education, resilience can be strengthened 
especially through practices that support learners’ participation and possibilities to 
have an impact in their school community, as well as by supporting the development 
of cognitive and social skills in accordance with the objectives of Dimension 1b. As an 
alternative to violent extremist movements, it is also important to promote and practice 
the use of democratic, non-violent ways of making a change. The knowledge and skills 
presented in Dimension 1b strengthen the resilience of learners and school communities 
and also address the transversal competencies set in the curricula, and also correspond to 
the skills that are needed in the 21st century. 
Dimension 2: Reactive and selective prevention (CVE)
Objective: To identify learners who need support, to guide them towards support, to 
know the key partners and to work actively as part of a multi-professional cooperation 
network.
The measures introduced in Dimension 2 are targeted at learners whose thoughts or 
actions raise concern in the educator or whose appearance or behaviour exhibit alarming 
changes over time. In such situations, reactive and selective prevention measures are 
only targeted at persons of concern. Concern can be related to situations, such as where 
the learner shows by their comments or behaviour that they are clearly interested in 
a violent ideology or violent actions. Changes in behaviour, appearance or comments 
implying extremist thinking do not automatically mean that the learner is adopting 
a violent extremist ideology. However, in all cases, changes that raise concerns must 
always be taken seriously as they are symptoms that indicate the learner is unwell and 
needs support. Extremist ideas can stem from a variety of reasons, so guiding the learner 
toward psychosocial support is central. The person of concern needs to be supported with 
personal guidance and follow-up, which is offered not only by the educator but also by the 
school’s student welfare team and/or youth workers, social and health care professionals 
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as well as different organisations. The learner’s guardians must also be actively involved in 
the guidance and support work carried out. Guardians must be consulted at an early stage 
and informed of the support plans and the development of the situation in a constructive 
and collaborative manner. 
Reactive and selective prevention refer to situations where the learner shows—for 
example, through their comments or behaviour—that they are interested in/support a 
violent ideology or threatens individuals or members of a group of people with violence. 
It is important for educators to distinguish joking and intentional provocation from 
situations that constitute a real threat. However, this can be challenging, especially in 
cases where learner groups change often and the educator does not meet an individual 
learner daily. The key factors at this stage are the educator’s professional competencies 
in knowing and encountering their students, the educational institution’s common 
operational culture, and early intervention. It is also important to present and talk about 
the use of democratic and non-violent means to make a change that respect human rights 
and offer an alternative to violent extremist movements. 
Dimension 3: Security threats and the required measures
Objective: To know the key partners and security instructions, and to act as part of a 
multi-professional cooperation network.
The changes observed in the learner’s behaviour or actions in Dimensions 3 and 4 
are so obvious that they impose a direct threat to the learner, as well as the sense of 
safety or security of the whole school community and/or society. In Dimensions 3 and 
4, the measures targeted at the individual are determined on a case-by-case basis and 
the multi-professional cooperation network must include members of the police and 
the local Anchor team, for example. It should be noted that, whenever applicable, the 
procedures in Dimensions 2–4 are predominantly determined by the guidelines given by 
the municipality and by other official actors. In situations where the educator suspects 
that the learner constitutes a threat to themselves or others, they must always contact 
the school head as well as actors providing student welfare services, such as the school 
psychologist and/or school social worker. If the question is of an acute threat, the police 
must be contacted immediately. The confidentiality obligation in basic education does not 
prevent disclosing information to the police if there is reason to suspect that somebody is 
in danger of being subjected to violence.
Dimension 4: Measures required by violent radicalisation
Objective: To know the key partners and act as part of a multi-professional cooperation 
network.
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Instructions of the Finnish National Agency for Education for crises: 
In the event of sudden crises, accidents, threats or danger, the actions to be taken by 
the educational institution are guided by the operating instructions for sudden crises, 
threats and dangers included in the school’s common student welfare plan, i.e. by the 
crisis plan, the rescue plan required by the Rescue Act, and, for the school personnel, 
the occupational health and safety action plan required by the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act.
In cases where somebody in the school community or educational institute threatens 
with violence or behaves violently, rapid intervention is necessary. As a rule, violence and 
threats of violence must be dealt with by the police, and it is important that the entire staff 
is familiar with the school’s operating instructions in such cases. The urgency of contacting 
the relevant actor must be assessed at the time of intervention, while ensuring the safety 
and security of all those involved in the situation. A protective network must immediately 
be constructed around the threatening person to protect them and the environment. It is 
for the police to assess the seriousness of the situation on the basis of their guidelines and 
to decide on the measures to be taken.
Measures: 
1. Increasing the basic knowledge of the education sector personnel: 
Producing a 60-minute online lecture for educators, including the 
following themes: key concepts, ideologies, violent radicalisation 
as a phenomenon, related background factors, the REDI model, 
significance of PVE in education on a larger societal scale, the 
role of educators. Responsible parties: Finnish National Agency 
for Education, the Expert network on resilience and extremism 
coordinated by the Faculty of Educational Sciences, the University of 
Helsinki.
2. Training key instructors. Arranging regionally comprehensive 
supplementary training to create a network of regional key 
instructors who support educators in early childhood education, 
general education and vocational education. Responsible parties: 
Finnish National Agency for Education, the Expert network on 
resilience and extremism coordinated by the Faculty of Educational 
Sciences, the University of Helsinki.
3. Increasing cooperation. Increasing cooperation and the exchange 
of information between different actors, such as universities, 
universities of applied sciences, researchers and educational 
institutions. Sharing up-to-date information supporting the work of 
educational institutions through the website of the Finnish National 
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Agency for Education. Responsible parties: Finnish National 
Agency for Education.
4. Continuing development work by participating in Nordic and 
international cooperation. Continuing participation in international 
and Nordic cooperation by supporting Pan-Nordic teacher training 
projects, for instance. Responsible parties: Finnish National 
Agency for Education.
Text part for the teaching sector: Katja Vallinkoski, University of Helsinki; Saija Benjamin, 
University of Helsinki; Pia-Maria Koirikivi, University of Helsinki, in collaboration with the 
Finnish National Agency for Education.
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Appendix 1
Experts who participated in the preparation of the National 
Action Plan 
National Cooperation Network
The National Cooperation Network acted as the steering group for the preparation of the 
National Action Plan in accordance with the decision on its preparation. The composition 
of the National Cooperation Network is as follows: 
Tarja Mankkinen, Head of Development, Chairperson, Ministry of the Interior; Mika 
Junninen, Senior Specialist, Ministry of Justice; Pekka Metso, Ambassador, Inter-
Cultural Dialogue Processes, Ministry of Justice; Elina Lemmetty, Ministry of Justice, Pirjo 
Lillsunde, Ministerial Adviser, Ministry of Social Affairs and Health; Merja Mikkola, Head 
of Development, Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare; Heli Nederström, Counsellor 
of Education, Ministry of Education and Culture; Annika Finnberg, Senior Specialist, 
Criminal Sanctions Agency; Sami Peltovuoma, Senior Specialist, Criminal Sanctions 
Agency; Satu Honkala, Counsellor of Education, Finnish National Agency for Education 
(deputy Kristina Kaihari, Counsellor of Education, Finnish National Agency for Education); 
Anna Santaholma, Senior Researcher, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service; Teemu 
Metsäpelto, Chief Inspector, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service; Timo Kilpeläinen, 
Chief Superintendent, National Police Board (deputy Sami Ryhänen, Chief Superintendent, 
National Police Board); Pekka Heikkinen, Chief Superintendent, National Board of 
Police; Hannele Häkkinen, Senior Specialist, Association of Finnish Local and Regional 
Authorities (deputy Anu Wikman-Immonen, Senior Specialist, Association of Finnish 
Local and Regional Authorities); Anneli Portman, Specialist, City of Helsinki (deputy Vesa 
Nevalainen, Head of Student Welfare, City of Helsinki); Konsta Korhonen, Senior Detective 
Superintendent, Oulu Police Department, Head of the local cooperation network in Oulu; 
Heikki Vähäkuopus, Head of the local cooperation network in Turku (deputy Ritva Jykelä, 
Director General, City of Turku); Jouni Perttula, Risk Management and Security Manager, 
City of Tampere, Head of the local cooperation network in Tampere; Milla Perukangas, 
Project Coordinator, Finn Church Aid (deputy Habiba Ali, Project Coordinator, Finn 
Church Aid); Matti Cantell, Specialist, Finnish Federation of Settlement Houses; Hunderra 
Ali Assefa, Nuoret Muslimit ry (deputy Adam, Nuoret Muslimit ry); Mina Bahmanpour, 
Member of the Board, Mahdin nuoret,  Kosar Mahmoodi, Member of the Board, Forum of 
Muslim Youth and Student Organizations NMF (deputy Abdel Bettahar, Member of the 
Board, Forum of Muslim Youth and Student Organizations); Pazilaiti Simayijiang, Youth 
Against Violent Extremism. 
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Workshop Grooming and recruitment 3 June 2019:
Katja Vallinkoski, University of Helsinki; Anneli Portman, City of Helsinki; Milla Perukangas, 
Finn Church Aid; Tommi Kotonen, University of Jyväskylä;, Konsta Korhonen, Oulu Police 
Department; Maarit Suhonen, Save the Children; Habiba Ali, Finn Church Aid; Merja 
Mikkola, Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare; Hajar Mahdavi, Mahdin Nuoret; Tarja 
Mankkinen, Ministry of the Interior. 
Workshop Religious communities 19 June 2019: 
Annika Finnberg, Criminal Sanctions Agency; Abbas Bahmanpour, Resalat Islamic 
Society; Anneli Portman, City of Helsinki; Anna Hyvärinen, Finnish Ecumenical Council; 
Stiven Naatus, National Church Council; Ann-Sofie Nyström, Finnish National Agency for 
Education; Hanne von Weissenberg, Tampere Diocese; Jouni Perttula, City of Tampere, 
Suaad Onniselkä, Vesala Comprehensive School, City of Helsinki; Ulla Siirto, National 
Church Council; Atik Ali, Finnish Muslim Network; Heikki Nenonen, Vicar of Haaga; Milla 
Perukangas, Finn Church Aid; Paula Kemell, Resalat Islamic Society; Pia Jardi, Islamic 
Council of Finland; Anas Hajjar, Islamic Council of Finland; Satu Honkala, Finnish National 
Agency for Education; Abdul Mannan, Islamic Society of Northern Finland; Elina Hellqvist, 
National Church Council; Teemu Pauha, University of Helsinki; Mustafa Kara, Islamic 
Society of Tampere; Pekka Heikkinen, National Police Board; Mina Bahmanpour, Mahdin 
Nuoret ry; Pirjo Lillsunde, Ministry for Social Affairs and Health; Arslan Taskin, Suomen 
Islamilainen Diyanet Yhdyskunta; Tarja Mankkinen, Ministry of the Interior; Susanna 
Sutinen,  Ministry of the Interior. 
Workshop Young people 3 June 2019:
Katja Vallinkoski, University of Helsinki; Heli Nederström, Ministry of Education and 
Culture; Anneli Portman, City of Helsinki; Hajar Mahdavi, Mahdin nuoret ry; Oussama 
Yousfi, Helsinki Deaconess Institute; Ahmed Abdulkarim, Helsinki Deaconess Institute; 
Joel Linnainmäki, Finnish National Youth Council Allianssi; Essi Kurki, City of Helsinki; Ann-
Sofie Nyström, Finnish National Agency for Education; Suvi Autiosaari, Pakolaisnuorten 
tuki ry; Abbas Bare, Pakolaisnuorten tuki ry; Abdulqaadir Mohamed, Pakolaisnuorten 
tuki ry; Konsta Korhonen, Oulu Police Department; Toni Kuoremäki, UN Youth of Finland; 
Katri Vainio, Finnish Somalia Network; Pia Koirikivi, University of Helsinki; Saija Benjamin, 
University of Helsinki; Milla Perukangas, Finn Church Aid; Annukka Kurki, Finn Church 
Aid; Habiba Ali, Finn Church Aid; Petteri Näreikkö, Changemaker; Merja Mikkola, Finnish 
Institute for Health and Welfare; Yassine Yousfi, Muvenna Project; Ibrahim Sehic, Muvenna 
Project; Salman Galid, Forum of Muslim Youth and Student Organizations NMF; Tarja 
Mankkinen, Ministry of the Interior; Sara Latvus, Finn Church Aid; Mohamed Hassan, 
African Talent and Change Foundation. 
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Education sector
The section on the education sector was drawn up by researchers Katja Vallinkoski, Saija 
Benjamin and Pia-Maria Koirikivi from the University of Helsinki. 
Radicalisation in prisons and prisoners to be released  
(preparatory group):
Annika Finnberg, Criminal Sanctions Agency; Ritva Elomaa, National Bureau of 
Investigation; Jouni Niskanen, Helsinki Police Department; Mika Junninen, Ministry of 
Justice; Katja Nissinen, Helsinki Police Department; Sami Peltovuoma, Criminal Sanctions 
Agency; Antti Hyyryläinen, National Bureau of Investigation; Sami Ryhänen, National 
Police Board; Merja Mikkola, Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare; Tarja Mankkinen, 
Ministry of the Interior. 
Workshop arranged in Oulu on 14 May 2019: 
Elina Hyvönen, City of Oulu, Immigrant Services; Kari Broström, City of Oulu, Utility 
Services; Mikko Nissinen, City of Oulu, Educational and Cultural Services; Priyanka Sood, 
City of Oulu, Multi-Cultural Services; Petri Walter, Educational Consortium OSAO; Hannu 
Kokko, Finnish Immigration Service; Mirja Pikkarainen, Criminal Sanctions Agency, Oulu 
Assessment Centre; Juha Rautiainen, Criminal Sanctions Agency, Oulu Prison; Risto 
Ottavainen, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service; Vesa Hiltunen, Finnish Security and 
Intelligence Service, Irmeli Korhonen, Oulu Police Department; Merja Rasinkangas, Oulu 
Police Department; Milla Kynkäänniemi, Oulun Police Department; Konsta Korhonen, Oulu 
Police Department; Tarja Mankkinen, Ministry of the Interior.
Workshop arranged in Turku on 6 May 2019: 
Habib Hasan, City of Turku; Petteri Iltanen, Criminal Sanctions Agency; Ritva Jykelä, City 
of Turku; Kimmo Kulmala, Southwest Finland Police Department; Irina Laasala, Criminal 
Sanctions Agency; Joni Lindeman, Finnish Defence Forces; Jyri Mikkola, City of Turku; Ilkka 
Myllymaa, Turku Adult Education Centre; Ann-Sofie Nyström, Finnish National Agency for 
Education; Miia Nääppä, City of Turku, Anchor Team; Milla Perukangas, Finn Church Aid; 
Mika Salonen, Southwest Finland Police Department; Janne Sundqvist, Turku University 
of Applied Sciences; Reetta Vainio, Southwest Finland Police Department; Sari Vanhanen, 
Migration Institute of Finland; Taina Viljanen, Diakonia Centre; Jarno Virjonen, Finnish Red 
Cross; Heikki Vähäkuopus, City of Turku; Märit Welin, City of Turku; Anu Parantainen, City 
of Turku; Marikki Sjöström, City of Turku; Mika Ranta, Turku cooperation network for the 
prevention of violent extremism; Ibrahim Sehic, Muvenna Project, Yassine Yousfi, Muvenna 
Project. 
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Workshop arranged by the National Police Board on 12 June 2019: 
Jarno Saarinen, Southeast Finland Police Department; Mikko Uusimäki, Ostrobothnia 
Police Department; Harri-Pekka Pohjolainen, Eastern Finland Police Department; 
Petteri Liimatainen, Häme Police Department; Tuomas Korhonen, Inland Finland 
Police Department; Hannu Väänänen, Western Uusimaa Police Department; Teemu 
Huttunen, Southwest Finland Police Department; Lauri Nikula, Oulu Police Department; 
Jarmo Heinonen, Helsinki Police Department; Sami Suosalmi, Eastern Uusimaa Police 
Department; Reko Silvenius, Lapland Police Department; Tarja Mankkinen, Ministry of the 
Interior. 
Researcher workshop 14 June 2019:
Pia-Maria Niemi, University of Helsinki; Ann-Sofie Nyström, Finnish National Agency 
for Education; Suaad Onniselkä, City of Helsinki; Teemu Pauha, City of Helsinki; Anneli 
Portman, City of Helsinki; Juha Saarinen, Kings College, London; Daniel Sallamaa, 
University of Helsinki; Anna Santaholma, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service; 
Karri Soppi, Finnish National Agency for Education; Teemu Tammikko, Finnish Institute 
of International Affairs; Lotta Tuomaala-Järvinen, City of Helsinki; Kati Vahtera, Finnish 
Immigration Service; Katja Vallinkoski, University of Helsinki; Leena Malkki, University of 
Helsinki; Tarja Mankkinen, Ministry of the Interior.
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Appendix 2
Description of the case management process, from tip-off to 
support
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Appendix 3 
Abbreviations and terms used in the Action Plan
Ideology In violent extremism, violence is used, instigated, encouraged or justified 
on the basis of ideological grounds. In this Action Plan, ideology refers to 
a worldview that is common to a specific group of people and stems from 
attitudes about groups of people, the world, religion, relations between 
people and states, human dignity, what is sacred and what is profane 
as well as corresponding beliefs that constitute a moral compass for an 
individual. 
Anchor work Anchor work involves multi-professional activities that have been pursued since the 
early 2000s. Anchor teams work in connection with police departments in different 
parts of the country. The work involves the police, social sector, health services, the 
education sector and often also youth services. It is targeted at children and young 
people under 18 years of age to promote their wellbeing and prevent crime. Anchor 
work seeks to prevent radicalisation into violent extremism without age limits. 
According to a survey conducted in 2018, approximately 200 professionals from 
different fields participate in Anchor work.
CTED Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate. Pursuant to UN Resolutions 
1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), a body assisting the UN Security Council’s Counter-
Terrorism Committee that implements the Security Council’s decisions, prepares 
country estimates in the UN Member States about their implementation of anti-
terrorism resolutions and supports the Member States in combatting terrorism. 
Daesh A terrorist organisation operating in Iraq and Syria, with networks extending to 
Europe, Asia, Africa and America. Also known by the abbreviations IS, ISIS and ISIL. 
OSCE The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 
EU   European Union.
CE   Council of Europe. A political cooperation and human rights organisation in Europe. 
EXIT operation An action plan supporting persons who want to reject violent extremist ideologies.
Human rights Human rights are written in international human rights agreements. The Finnish 
Government has promised to secure these rights for its citizens and everyone living 
in Finland.
Indoctrination Indoctrination means activities through which a person is subjected to teaching 
and is only taught specific doctrines or ideas. The person has no possibility or 
capacity to independently assess the content of the teaching. The term is related to 
brainwashing and ideological influence. 
IS   Islamic State. A terrorist organisation operating in Iraq and Syria, with networks 
extending to Europe, Asia, Africa and America. Also known by the abbreviations ISIL, 
ISIS and Daesh. 
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ISIL  Islamic State in Iraq and Levant. A terrorist organisation operating in Iraq and Syria, 
with networks extending to Europe, Asia, Africa and America. Also known by the 
abbreviations IS, ISIS and Daesh. 
ISIS  Islamic State in Iraq and Levant. A terrorist organisation operating in Iraq and Syria, 
with networks extending to Europe, Asia, Africa and America. Also known by the 
abbreviations IS, ISIS and Daesh. 
KAVI  National Audiovisual Institute. 
NBI  National Bureau of Investigation.
NGO  Non-governmental organisation. 
MIGRI Finnish Immigration Service
Nordic Safe Cities Nordic Safe Cities is a network that broadly involves cities in different Nordic 
countries. One of its aims is to prevent violent radicalisation and extremism that 
threatens the safety, security and tolerance of cities and their inhabitants and also 
seeks to undermine Nordic values and social cohesion. 
MEC  Ministry of Education and Culture. 
MJ   Ministry of Justice.
FNAE Finnish National Agency for Education.
Fundamental rights
   Fundamental rights refer to rights in the Constitution of Finland. They are 
fundamental values and important to everyone. Fundamental rights guarantee for 
everyone the right to life. Fundamental rights include the right to personal freedom 
and integrity, freedom of movement, freedom to protect private life, freedom of 
speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of association and the freedom of religion. 
NPB  National Police Board.
RAN  Radicalisation Awareness Network operating in connection with the EU. 
CSA  Criminal Sanctions Agency. 
Resilience Resilience refers to flexibility and the ability to cope with changes. It can also mean 
resistance to attempts of influence, for example. 
SOTE Healthcare and social welfare services. 
MI   Ministry of the Interior. 
MSAH Ministry of Social Affairs and Health.
FSIS  Finnish Security and Intelligence Service.
NIHW Finnish Institute for Health and Welfare.
Dialogue/interaction between religions
   The aim of dialogue between religions is to increase understanding between people 
who represent different cultures and religions and to reduce radicalisation and 
strengthen social order.
Hate crime Hate crime is crime targeted at a person, group, a person’s property, institution or a 
representative of these, motivated by prejudice or hostility towards the victim’s real 
or perceived ethnic or national origin, religion or belief, sexual orientation, gender 
identity or appearance or disability. The Criminal Code of Finland does not contain a 
definition of hate crime or racist crime. However, the racial hatred motive of a crime, 
which in 2011 was also extended to cover other hate motives, has been taken into 
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consideration as grounds for increasing the punishment (Criminal Code of Finland, 
Chapter 6, section 5(4), 13 May 2011/511). In addition to grounds for increasing 
punishment, the legislation also refers to some offences whose constituent 
elements include a hate motive. Such crimes are discrimination, ethnic agitation and 
aggravated ethnic agitation.
HCSP Health Care Services for Prisoners.
Violent extremism Violent extremism refers to using, threatening, instigating, encouraging or justifying 
violence on the basis of ideological grounds. 
Violent radicalisation
   Violent radicalisation is a process through which individuals end up using or 
threatening with violence, urging someone to commit acts of violence or justifying 
it on ideological grounds. During the radicalisation process, the individual begins 
to accept and favour violence, regardless of the ideology or stimuli adopted from 
different ideologies that they use to justify violence.  
UN  United Nations.
Ministry of the Interior
www.intermin.fi
PO Box 26, FI-00023 Government
